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This thesis investigates questions of international trade, multinational firm production
and economic growth. Firstly, Chapter 2 quantifies the total gains from openness such
that firms can either export to their foreign markets or carry out horizontal FDI char-
acterised by intra firm exports of intermediate inputs from parent firms to their sub-
sidiaries. This is motivated by the fact that despite empirical evidence on the rising
importance of intermediate good inputs in trade shares, literature on gains from trade
has not adequately accounted for intermediate input share in calculating total trade
gains. Intermediate input shares play an important role as they affect the trade elastic-
ity hence welfare changes, we find that gains from trade and FDI derived in this model
are higher than the current documented gains in trade literature. Chapter 3 presents
a dynamic general equilibrium model of corporate taxation of heterogeneous produc-
tivity firms that enter foreign markets via exports or setting up a multinational firm
subsidiary. This model is at the nexus of international trade models of firm heterogene-
ity and endogenous growth model without scale effects. Chapter 4 investigates inter-
national trade of exhaustible resources in a differential game over a continuous time.
When exhaustible resources are concerned in questions of economics, inter-temporal
trade offs between generations cannot be ignored as resources are depleting. Standard
static models of international trade that argue that countries trade because of differ-
ent factor endowments are not enough because resource prices change over time, and
the exhaustible resource endowment is also declining over time. It is therefore natural
to consider dynamic tools such as differential games to address economic questions of
trade of exhaustible resources. Central to our study is the result that Hartwick’s rule is
broken, i.e. not all resource rents are reinvested into capital.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background Motivation
Central to debates and discussions forums within economic cycles is the question, how
does globalization benefit economies? Many countries have developed policies that en-
able them to be participants in the global market, however their main concern is how
international trade and foreign direct investment (hereafter, abbreviated FDI) harm
or foster economic growth. Thus far, there are insurmountable volumes of literature
documenting both positive and negative effects of foreign direct investment and interna-
tional trade depending on the countries engaged. For example, Singh (2010) concluded
that the effects of international trade on economic growth and welfare remains am-
biguous in terms of both theoretical models and empirical research. In economics the
subject of globalisation touches the realms of growth theory and industrial organization
beyond international trade. In static models of trade and FDI there is a consensus
among economists of the gains from globalisation; that is, both consumers and firms
benefit from specialization and from the access to a broader variety of goods on the
world market. However, a theoretical debate has ensued and it questions the advantage
of globalisation through trade and FDI in dynamic set-ups. Against this background,
this thesis tries to contribute to the theoretical debate surrounding the effects of trade
and FDI, focusing in particular on the total gains from trade and FDI, implications
for economic growth through productivity changes and the role of exhaustible resources
in international trade. The following subsections; (1.1.1), (1.1.2), (1.1.3) provide brief
motivations and overview of the three essays of this thesis.
1
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1.1.1 Quantifying Gains from Trade and Foreign Direct Investment
with Heterogeneous Firms
The pioneering work of Samuelson (1939) showed that there are gains from trade, con-
sequently one of the pertinent questions in international trade literature is how best
to measure these gains. The workhorse empirical tool to measure the welfare gains in
international trade is the empirical gravity model of trade. There is a wide variety of
theoretical models that provide the foundation for the gravity model and interpret the
empirical patterns of bilateral trade. After the works of Samuelson (1939) all attempts
made to understand gains from trade focused on identifying aggregate relationships
through cross-country comparisons using empirical analysis. For example, Sachs and
Warner (1995) argued that open economies tend to experience higher growth rates than
closed economies. On the theory side, traditional models of trade, such as those based
on Ricardo (1821) and Heckscher and Ohlin (1991), focus on gains from specialization
by comparative advantage in settings of homogeneous firms. More recent trade models
which studies the gains from trade take a different approach, they consider firms that are
heterogeneous in their productivity levels and conclude that less productive firms exit
the market due to stronger competition from imports, as a result resources shift to more
productive firms which can then produce and sell more. The net result is an increase in
average productivity. A more recent work by Arkolakis et al. (2012) has shown that both
the traditional trade models with homogeneous firms and the new trade models with
heterogeneous firms all yield the same measure of trade gains. Arkolakis et al. (2012)’s
result is based on the assumption that only the trade elasticity and the country’s ex-
penditure share on traded goods are the two static measures necessary to measure the
gains from trade. Interestingly, the gains from trade measured in Arkolakis et al. (2012)
only considered inter-trade transactions. i.e, trade between non affiliated firms between
countries. However, Bernard et al. (2009) carried out an empirical study that showed
that a substantial volume of trade takes place within the multinational firms. This
implies that there is intra-firm trade between parent firms and their subsidiaries. This
provides an motivation to investigate total gains from trade taking into account both
inter-firm trade and intra-firm trade.
1.1.2 Capital taxation, Heterogeneous Multinational and Trade Firms
in a Model of productivity Growth
Trade theories have investigated how product variety is affected by trade flows and
multinational firm production. On the other hand endogenous growth models have
tackled question of how process innovation affects mass of diversified products. Amongst
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the first studies that combined trade and growth was the work of Rivera-Batiz and
Romer (1991), their study attempted to reconcile two seemingly contradictory views;
endogenous growth models with increasing returns as investigated by Romer (1990)
showed that trade restrictions lead to a decline in the rate of economic growth, in contrast
Grossman and Helpman (1991) showed that in some circumstances, trade restrictions
could nevertheless increase economic growth. Still, the corporate taxation effects in such
models are still missing even though it is apparent and clear in vast empirical studies that
corporate taxes affect the specialisation pattern and location decisions of firms. Egger
et al. (2010) investigated whether foreign plant ownership involves lower tax payments
than domestic plant ownership. Their empirical study concluded that foreign owned
firms paid lower taxes than domestic firms in high tax jurisdictions but higher taxes in
lower tax jurisdictions hence the opportunity to shifts profits. Hence this paper sheds
light on corporate taxation effects on heterogeneous firm productivity, economic growth
and decisions of being a multinational and trade firm.
1.1.3 Impact of Exhaustible Resources on opening for International
Trade: Hartwick’s rule and taste for foreign goods (joint work
with Anton Bondarev )
The stocks of natural resources that exist in the natural environment are both scarce
and economically useful as they are used as a component of the production process or for
consumption, either in their raw state or after a minimal amount of processing. These
exhaustible resources are characterised by uneven distribution across countries, highly
volatile prices and dominance in output and trade. Most of the exhaustible resource
rich countries are typically third world poor countries under the spell of the “resource
curse”, that is, they fail to benefit fully from their natural resource wealth, making it
difficult for governments in these countries to respond effectively to public welfare needs.
Transactions of exhaustible resource exports have been significantly on the rise and their
impact on economic growth of resource rich countries have been well documented. What
is peculiar about the study of international trade of exhaustible resources is that the
depletion of a non-renewable resource involves an inter-temporal trade-off; if a resource
is consumed today, it cannot be consumed tomorrow. These inter-temporal trade-offs
pose unique challenges for policy-makers, in part because exhaustible resources are both
essential to the production process and actually or potentially exhaustible. This implies
that trade of exhaustible resources resources has both “static” and “dynamic” economic
effects.
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Static trade theory models such as Heckscher and Ohlin (1991) emphasis that a country
will trade (export) a commodity which uses its abundant factor intensively or differences
in factor endowments will prompt countries to export commodities for which they have
comparative advantage as in the model of Ricardo (1821). This shows that endowments
of natural resources may form the basis for trade in resource rich countries. In support of
this reasoning, Leamer (1984) showed that the relative abundance of oil leads to net ex-
ports of crude oil and mineral abundance leads to net exports of raw materials. However
the main shortcoming of trade theories is that they do not directly address this problem
of exhaustibility and the inter-temporal trade-offs involved. Resource exhaustibility im-
plies that price level also changes over time so are the levels of resources extracted, this
necessitates adopting a dynamic approach that takes into account the change over time
in the availability of a finite resource. This motivates the use of dynamic games where
we are able to construct a continuous time model of international trade with resource
exhaustibility. .
1.2 Contributions and Organisation
This thesis contains three separate chapters, Chapter 2 quantifies the gains from trade
and multinational firms under a framework of heterogeneous productivities. Chapter
3 constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model of corporate taxation of firms that
enter foreign markets via FDI or trade in an endogenous productivity growth framework.
Finally, in Chapter 4 we study a continuous time differential game of international trade
in the presence of exhaustible resources. Following I provide brief synopsis of the specific
contributions of each chapter;
Chapter 2; Quantifying Gains from Trade and FDI with Heterogeneous Firms
The issue of quantifying gains from trade is of long-standing importance in international
trade. Gains from trade derived by Arkolakis et al. (2012) were shown to be the same
in all quantitative trade models under both perfect competition models such as Arming-
ton (1969) and Eaton and Kortum (2002a) and monopolistic competition Melitz (2003).
The derivation is based on the observed share of a country’s trade with itself (share of
expenditure on domestic goods), λj , and the elasticity of aggregate trade costs, ε. In
this chapter we extend the result obtained by Arkolakis et al. (2012) by incorporating
tradable intermediate inputs within the multinational firm. Consideration of intra firm
intermediate good input is consistent with Bernard et al. (2009) as they found out that
multinational firms comprise a substantial majority of U.S. trade, roughly 90% of U.S.
exports and imports. We derive a closed form formulation for the total gains from in-
ternational trade (both arms length trade and intra-firm trade). We find out that trade
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elasticity is affected also by the share of intermediate inputs. Therefore considering
intermediate good input share magnifies the gains from trade resulting in larger trade
gains. We find out that, with trade elasticity of 4, when the intermediate share is 1/3
the gains from trade in the fashion of Arkolakis et al. (2012) is 3% while the gains from
openness is 11% the difference between our set up (gains from trade and multinational
firm intra firm trade ) and the trade only gains is 8%.
Chapter 3; Capital Taxation, Trade and FDI in endogenous productivity
Growth Model
In this chapter we contribute to the small but growing strand of theoretical research that
incorporates firm heterogeneity into models of tax policy towards mobile, multinational
firms and trade. We present an extended heterogeneous firms productivity model de-
veloped by Melitz (2003) with steady-state productivity growth but without the strong
scale effect. The model has an embedded frame work of innovation led productivity
growth developed by Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010). Simply put, the aim of this
chapter is to provide a link between firm heterogeneity, innovation and the consequent
productivity growth implications in the presence of corporate taxes. Firstly we find that
corporate taxes have competing effects on the output level via decrease of the number
of intermediate varieties and an increase in final out put labour supply. This implies
that we get the result that for certain higher taxes we still get higher economic growth
since the labour increase in final output implies increase in output in the model. This
implies a higher economic growth due to its equivalence to the output growth, of course
this depends on the extreme possibility that the effect through the labour channel is
strong enough (dominates the effect on varieties), then higher corporate taxes may lead
to higher output growth. Secondly we find that openness to trade or multinational does
not affect the long run growth rate of the economy neither does it affect the share of
labour allocated to R&D sA. However trade liberalisation and openness to multina-
tional firm production had a level effect on mass of varieties produced M(t) ↓ due to
slow down in variety creation. Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) arrives to the same
reasoning and explained that as cut-off costs decreases more firms enter export market
hence a rise in the number of available varieties but this leads to more competition and
lower profits, this in turn induces fewer firms to enter the market thus slowing down the
variety process creation.
Chapter 4; Impact of exhaustible resource on opening for international trade:
Hartwick’s rule and taste for foreign goods
We develop a model of world economy with two countries where one of them dubbed
home sells the exhaustible resource to final producers in both countries, which compete at
the final goods market. The interaction between final producers is reached via the sticky
price mechanics, whereas price continuously adjusts to produce final product quantities.
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We study the effect of opening up to trade on the home resource-abundant economy. It
turns out that resource trade may foster structural change via substitution of resource
by technology in production only if the home country is sufficiently developed and tastes
of consumers are not too much biased towards foreign goods. Otherwise open trade may
be detrimental for the home economy, since expenditures grow faster than resource rents
and the Hartwick’s rule does not hold.
Chapter 2
Quantifying Gains from Trade
and Foreign Direct Investment
with Heterogeneous Firms
2.1 Introduction
Quantifying gains from trade and foreign direct investment is a long-standing issue of
economic importance. Recently Arkolakis et al. (2012) developed a static measure of
gains from trade. The paper did not however address total gains from trade and FDI.
According to the OECD (2013) foreign direct investment (FDI) statistics report, in the
first quarter of 2013, the magnitude of global FDI inflows and outflows were 357 and 353
billion US dollars respectively (figure 2.1 shows the global trends of FDI transactions).
Furthermore, UNCTAD projected that global FDI flows could rise to $1.6 trillion in
2014, $1.75 trillion in 2015 and $1.85 trillion in 2016. The report asserted that the rise
will be mainly driven by investments in developed economies as their economic recovery
starts to take hold and spread wider. In this regard, we extend the analysis of Arkolakis
et al. (2012) by quantifying total gains from both trade and FDI.
In the same frame of mind, Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2013) stated that worldwide
sales of multinational companies are in the order of twice that of total exports. Based on
this revelation, the objective of this study is to measure gains from trade and FDI (via
intra firm trade of intermediate good inputs). Where current research considers gains
from FDI and trade, their approach differs from a heterogeneous productivity framework
of Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004). For example, Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare
(2013) estimated gains from openness based on the framework developed by Eaton and
Kortum (2002a) .
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Figure 2.1: Global FDI inflows from 1995 to 2013 and projections 2014 to 2016 in
Billion US$
Source:UNCTAD World Investment Report 2014
Generally gains from FDI include amongst others;
• Gains from resource transfer; Findlay (1978), Lall (1974), Loungani and Razin
(2001), and Romer and Frankel (1999), asserted that FDI brings physical capi-
tal, new technology, increased competition and improved methods of conducting
business. These resources are transferred into domestic firms leading to increased
average productivity, increased product and process innovations;
• Employment gains; FDI has the potential to increase employment in the local
economy which leads to increased spending and increased multiplier effects in the
domestic economy;
• Balance of payments effects; gains from the balance of payments effects are derived
from improvement in the capital account due to the inflows of new capital into the
host country and improvements in the current account balance because of possible
decline in imports of goods and service;
• Technology spillovers; Hymer (1976) noted that technological spillovers are derived
from adopting the product, process and organizational innovations initiated by the
multinational firm. It is worthwhile to mention at this point that, in our present
study we only consider the change in per capita value of real income accruing to
consumers as the measure of gains from FDI and trade.
In our analysis, gains from openness equals the (absolute value of) the percentage change
in real income associated with moving one country from the current, observed trade
Chapter 2. Quantifying Gains from Trade and Foreign Direct Investment with
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and FDI equilibrium to a counter-factual equilibrium. Gains from trade were derived
by Arkolakis et al. (2012) as Gj = 1 − (λj)− 1ε , comprising of two static measures;(i)
share of expenditure on domestic goods and (ii) an elasticity of imports with respect to
variable trade costs, (trade elasticity). In this study we find that there are additional
gains from FDI which is facilitated by traded intermediate inputs. Consequently total
gains from trade and FDI(gains from openness) are; Wˆj =
(
λ
1
γ
MF
+ λEX
)− 1
ε
. Where ε
is the elasticity of substitution, γ is the ratio between wages in the destination country
where a foreign affiliate is set up and intermediate input costs. Therefore gains from
openness (Trade and FDI) are higher than gains in a trade only model as shown by
Arkolakis et al. (2012).
The set up of our model is based on the model developed by Helpman et al. (2004)
who extends the Melitz model by incorporating FDI and shows that firms sort into
exporting and FDI based on heterogeneity on their productivity levels. They predict that
only firms that are productive enough to cover the fixed cost of exporting can export.
Since the fixed cost of FDI is larger than that of exporting, firms that conduct FDI
must be more productive than firms that only export. However, we consider the use of
intermediate goods in foreign affiliates production plants shipped from country of origin
of the multinational firm. This is consistent with Bernard et al. (2009) as they found out
that multinationals comprise a substantial majority of U.S. trade, roughly 90% of U.S.
exports and imports. This will allow us to examine the relationship between trade and
FDI. This approach is closely related to Brainard (1997), Markusen and Venables (2000),
Helpman et al. (2004) who asserted that trade and FDI are complementary, i.e., a rise in
trade costs leads to a replacement of exports by FDI production in destination countries.
The standard production frameworks in Eaton and Kortum (2002a) and Melitz (2003)
provide no relationship between the intermediate input share and the trade elasticity.
A model closely related to our work is provided by Keller and Yeaple (2009), where for-
eign affiliate production used intermediate inputs in production shipped from the parent
firms. They found out that trade facilitates FDI and FDI boosts trade. A quantifiable
multi-country general equilibrium model developed by Tintelnot (2013) showed that
gains from multinational production are much smaller due to fixed costs of establishing
foreign plants. The author pointed out that these gains may increase significantly if free
entry is taken into account. Therefore we allow for free firm entry in our model.
With this framework, we conduct a quantitative analysis. We use data for the year 2009
for all U.S. affiliates and parent firms which are non banking. I use the BEA data set
which provides aggregate exports by US parents firms to all its foreign affiliates and and
aggregate imports from all US foreign affiliates to the US parents. We find out that,
with trade elasticity of 4, when the intermediate share is 1/3 the gains from trade in the
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spirit of Arkolakis et al. (2012) is 3% while the gains from openness is 11% the difference
between our set up (gains from trade and multinational firm intra firm trade ) and the
trade only gains is 8%.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows, Section [2.2] presents the theoretical model
describing the assumptions, technology and cost structure of domestic, export and FDI
firms, preferences and demand, and finally the firm’s decision problem. Section [2.3],
shows aggregation and equilibrium of the model. Section [2.4] shows the theoretical trade
and FDI gains derived from the model, finally section [2.5] provides the quantitative
relevance on the result by using data to calculate the total gains from openness. Lastly
the conclusion is provided in Section [2.6].
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2.2 Model
Following Helpman et al. (2004), there are N countries and H+1 sectors. Each country
i is endowed with Li units of labour with wage rate wi . Consumers in each country
derive utility from H + 1 sectors; the first sector 0 produces a homogeneous good with
1 unit of labour per unit output and the H sectors produce differentiated products. We
assume that the homogeneous good is freely traded with wage rate equal to 1 and it is
produced under constant returns to scale which will ensures factor price equalisation as
long as each and every country produces it. An exogenous fraction of income
∑
h 1− βh
is spent on the homogeneous sector and βh is spent on the differentiated goods sector.
2.2.1 Preferences and Demand
Preferences are a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of the homogeneous good sector and differen-
tiated traded goods and CES across a continuum of differentiated goods in h = 1 , ...,H
sectors.
U = q1−βh0
H∏
h=1
(∫
ω∈Ωh
qh(ω)
σh−1
σh dω
) σh
σh−1
βh
(2.1)
The elasticity of substitution σ > 1 between varieties and within the firm is the same,
hence we use the standard optimal pricing rule. We proceed in the same spirit as
Helpman et al. (2004), we drop the sectoral index h in light of the view that all sectoral
variables refers to a particular sector h that produces differentiated products. The
consumer’s problem is to maximize their utility subject to a budget constraint. This
yields the following export and FDI demand functions for the differentiated products;
q(ω) = β
p(ω)−σ
P 1−σj
Yj (2.2)
Where Pj is the ideal price index in country j, and p(ω) is the price charged on goods.
With monopolistic competition and Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, the price charged is a
constant mark-up σσ−1 = ρ of the costs of production, therefore a firm from country i
exporting or carrying FDI in country j charges the following prices;
pEXij (ϕ) = ρ
wiτij
ϕ
(price charged by exporting firm) (2.3)
pMFij (ϕ) = ρ
(wj)
γ(wiτij)
1−γ
ϕγ
(price charged by a multinational firm) (2.4)
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where, EX , MF refers to export and multinational firm respectively and ϕ is the pro-
ductivity of the firm. The price index Pj of the aggregate bundle of exports and FDI is
the ideal price index in country j
(Pj)
1−σ =

ϕ
MF
ij∫
ϕ
EX
ij
(pEX )
1−σdG(ϕ) +
∞∫
ϕ
MF
ij
(pMF )
1−σdG(ϕ)
 (2.5)
The above aggregate price index can be split into price index for imported goods and
price index for foreign affiliate goods as follows, (dropping all the sector sub scripts),
(PEXj )
1−σ = NEX

ϕ
MF
ij∫
ϕ
EX
ij
(pEXij )
1−σdG(ϕ)
 = (NEX ) 11−σ pEXij (ϕEXij ) (2.6)
(PMFj )
1−σ = NMF

∞∫
ϕ
MF
ij
(pMFij )
1−σhdG(ϕ)
 = (NMF ) 11−σ pMFij (ϕMFij ) (2.7)
In both cases, the price index is a multiple of the distribution of lowest prices and mass
of varieties NEX and NMF for exports and FDI respectively from country i to country
j. It is decreasing in average productivity cut-offs and number of varieties available, and
increasing in wages, transportation costs. It then follows that the aggregate price index
(2.5) can be written as the sum of equations (2.6) and (2.7) as:
(Pj)
1−σ = (NEX )
1
1−σ pEXij (ϕ
EX
ij ) + (NMF )
1
1−σ pMFij (ϕ
EX
ij ) (2.8)
The aggregate price index is decreasing in cut-off productivities and total number of
varieties provided by multinational production and imports. Since the trade of final and
intermediate goods are subject to iceberg transportation costs, the aggregate price index
in an increasing function of transportation costs, and wages paid to labour in foreign
affiliate plant and country of origin.
2.2.2 Technology and Cost Structure
Domestic Firm Costs
Firms in country i can enter the domestic market by paying fixed costs of entry fEi > 0
(measured in units of labour) which is thereafter sunk. Expectation of future positive
profits is the only motivation for firms to incur these sunk costs. After observing the
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productivity parameter ϕ from the distribution G(ϕ) the firm may start production and
pay additional fixed costs fDi > 0 with marginal costs
C =
wi
ϕ
(2.9)
Depending on the level of their productivity, domestic firms have two alternatives of
serving foreign markets, either through exports or setting up a foreign affiliate in the
destination country1. Proximity concentration trade off provides a motivation for deci-
sions to either export or FDI.
Exporting Firm Costs
If ϕ is sufficiently low, a firm may decide to start exporting and pays additional fixed
costs for each export destination. These fixed costs are given by fEX > 0. The marginal
cost for an exporting firm from country i to export destination j is given by
CEXij =
wiτij
ϕ
(2.10)
Exports are subject to melting iceberg transportation costs τij > 1, i.e., τij units have
to be shipped from country i for one unit of the good to arrive in country j . As
in Melitz (2003) the marginal costs in equation (2.10) of an exporting firm increase
as the transportation and labour costs increase and they decrease with a rise in firm
productivity.
FDI Firm Costs
If a firm originating from country i chooses to set up a production plant in a foreign
country j it incurs fixed costs of FDI defined as fMF . These fixed costs includes among
others, the costs of setting up or acquiring a physical structure, marketing and infor-
mation and etc. Following Irarrazabal et al. (2013) we introduce intra-firm trade into
FDI to be consistent with the fact that the relationship between export and outward
FDI is complementary. However our analysis does not consider any sourcing strategies
for intermediate goods as in the case of Helpman (2006). A thorough illustration of
technological trade off between intermediate good production in the country of origin
and in the destination country is provided by Keller and Yeaple (2009).
1 for analysis of gains from openness, we restrict our study hereafter only to exporting and FDI, see
Arkolakis et al. (2012), Irarrazabal et al. (2013),
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Foreign affiliates from country i in country j use intermediate inputs from country i ,
these intermediate goods are subject to melting iceberg transportation costs τij . There-
fore the cost function is of cobb-douglas form given by
CMFij =
(
1
ϕγ
)(
wj
γ
)γ (wiτij
1− γ
)1−γ
(2.11)
Where
0 ≤ γ < 1, is the ratio of foreign plant labour cost to intermediate inputs used produce
goods in foreign affiliates. On the right hand side of equation (2.11) the first term
indicates the inverse relationship between the costs and productivity level in the same
spirit as the discussion under exporting firm costs. The second term shows the wage rate
in the destination country j and the third term is the cost of intermediate input used
in the foreign affiliate production. Note that when γ = 1 equation (2.11) yield identical
marginal costs to those in the paper of export versus FDI with heterogeneous firms
by Helpman et al. (2004). From (2.11), an increase in the size of trade costs between
the affiliate and country of origin results in an increase in marginal trade costs of the
affiliate. Equation (2.11) derives from a cobb-douglas production function with a cost
share γ for labour and 1− γ for intermediate input. This can be represented as
q =
(
1
ϕγ
)(
L
γ
)γ (Qinputj
1− γ
)1−γ
(2.12)
Having outlined the demand for the differentiated varieties, the cost structures for export
and FDI prodution, in the same spirit as Helpman et al. (2004), sales are therefore given
by the following equation:
Xijv(ϕv) = β
(
pijv(ϕ)
Pj
)1−σ
Yj (2.13)
Such that v = [EX ,MF ]
2.2.3 Firms Decision Problem and Cut-off Costs and Productivities
A firm from country i will serve a foreign country j if the operating profits are sufficient
to cover costs of entry (fixed costs). We get exporting and FDI firm profits respectively
as:
piEXij = βP
σ−1
j
(
ρwiτij
ϕ
)1−σ Yj
σ
− fEX (2.14)
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piMFij = βP
σ−1
j
(
ρwγj (wiτij)
1−γ
ϕγ
)1−σ
Yj
σ
− fMF (2.15)
Firms will serve foreign markets through exports or FDI if the operating profits are
greater than fixed costs. Therefore the zero profit condition for exporting and FDI firms
is given by the following equations respectively:
piEXij = 0 =⇒ βP σ−1j
(
ρwiτij
ϕ
)1−σ Yj
σ
= fEX (2.16)
piMFij = 0 =⇒ βP σ−1j
(
ρwγj (wiτij)
1−γ
ϕγ
)1−σ
Yj
σ
= fMF (2.17)
From the zero profit conditions of exporting and FDI firms in equations (2.16) and (2.17)
we can find the cutoff productivities as follows;
Export Productivity Cut Off
We revert to the zero profit condition for exporting forms and substitute export firm
costs from equation (2.10). We find that the productivity cut-off for exporting firms is
given by;
ϕ˜EXij = κ
(
fEXij
Yj
) 1
σ−1
P−1j wiτij (2.18)
where κ =
(
σ
β
) 1
σ−1
ρ. Firms with an export productivity cut-off in equation (2.18) have
just break even. Therefore firms with a higher productivity than export productivity
cut-off in equation (2.18) expect to make positive profits. This result is consistent with
Helpman et al. (2004) and with Melitz (2003)
FDI Productivity Cut-off
This is the productivity cut-off level where the firm is indifferent between exporting
and FDI. Moreover, if profits of having multinational foreign affiliates are greater than
profits accrued from accessing foreign markets through exports, then FDI is the preferred
choice. This is the same argument provided in Helpman et al. (2004).
ϕ˜MFij =
[
κ
(
fMFij − fEXij
Yj [(Ωijτij)γ(σ−1) − 1]
) 1
σ−1
wiτij
Pj
] 1
γ
(2.19)
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Firms with a productivities between export and FDI cut-off productivities, i.e., between
(2.18) and (2.19) will serve the foreign market through exports only. Firms with a
productivity cut-off given by (2.19) have just break even and make zero profits if they
access the foreign market via FDI. However all firms with a productivity above the FDI
productivity cut-off expect to make positive profits as they are able to cover fixed costs.
To ensure that the FDI cut-off productivity is higher than export productivity, i.e.,
ϕMFij > ϕ
EX
ij , we assume that fMFΩ
γ(σ−1)
ij > fEX τ
(σ−1).
2.3 Aggregation and Equilibrium
In this section we present aggregation of cut-off productivity levels, price indices, ex-
ports and FDI sales, in country j. There is a continuum of prospective entrants that
are the same ex-ante. To enter, they pay a sunk entry cost fEi > 0 units of labour,
wjfEX in the case of exporting firms or wjfMF in the case of FDI firms. Thereafter,
firms independently draw productivity levels from a common distribution from a PDF
g(ϕ) = kϕkϕ−(k+1) with positive support over (0, ..., ϕii) and a continuous cumulative
distribution G(ϕ) = 1 −
(
ϕ
ϕii
)k
: ϕii is the minimum productivity in the productivity
distribution. Productivity is assumed to be Pareto distributed and the degree of firm
heterogeneity is summarized by the shape parameter k > σ − 1. This insures that the
distribution of productivity draws finite variances. Since k is an inverse measure of vari-
ance, lower values of k correspond to greater firm heterogeneity (larger variance of firm
productivity).
The Pareto distribution has a number of properties that make it analytically tractable
hence its use on models of firm selection into export and FDI markets. From empirical
evidence, it is a good approximation of the upper tail of distribution of firm sizes, this
was first noted by Simon and Bonini (1958). Pareto distribution for U.S. and European
firms used to predict FDI was estimated by Helpman et al. (2004). A key feature of a
Pareto distributed random variable is that when truncated the random variable retains a
Pareto distribution with the same shape parameter k. Therefore if entry is subject to an
endogenous productivity cut-off, the distribution of the technologies that make the cut
remains Pareto distributed. Another key feature of a Pareto distributed random vari-
able is that power functions of this random variable are themselves Pareto distributed.
Therefore, individual prices have a Pareto distribution, with a constant elasticity of
demand, so do sales, hence firm size and variable profits are Pareto distributed.
In the same vein as Melitz (2003) we let M denote the equilibrium mass of incumbent
domestic firms in each country. Firms decisions to enter into domestic industry and or
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into foreign markets via exports and FDI are based on comparing expected profits and
costs of entering the market. The probability of entry in the home market, exporting
and into FDI (conditional on successful entry) are given by the following equations
respectively:
θiD = 1−G(ϕ∗i ) (2.20)
θEX =
G(ϕ∗MF )−G(ϕ∗EX )
1−G(ϕ∗i )
(2.21)
θMF =
1−G(ϕ∗MF )
1−G(ϕ∗i )
(2.22)
Using these conditional probabilities of successful entry, the mass of firms that enter
foreign country via exports and FDI are given by NEX = θEXN and NMF = θMFN ,
respectively. In the same spirit as Melitz (2003) we assume that the economy under
study can trade with n ≥ 1 other countries, the world is then comprised of n + 1 ≥ 2.
Total mass of varieties available to consumers in each country is given by the total mass
of firms competing in the country,
N = ND + nNEX + nNMF (2.23)
Weighted productivity average
ϕ̂ =
1
N
(
Nϕ̂σ−1iD + nNEX τ
1−σϕ̂σ−1EX + nNMF τ
(1−σ)(1−η)ϕ̂σ−1MF
) 1
σ−1
(2.24)
Aggregate price index as a function of weighted aggregate productivity and mass of
varieties is given by P = N
1
1−σ p(ϕ̂). This price index is a decreasing as total mass
of varieties increases and aggregate productivity increases. This implies that consumer
welfare is given by W = N
1
σ−1 ρϕ̂. From this welfare function, we have (a) variety gains;
increase in consumer welfare with a rise in varieties, (b) productivity gains, higher
weighted average productivity implies that costs of production are lower hence lower
prices are charged for consumer goods.
2.3.1 Free-Entry Condition
Prior to entry, potential entrants contemplate profits they would incur if they enter and
compare the expected profits to fixed costs of entry, fEi . In a stationary equilibrium
as long as a firm is active it earns the same profits in each period. Ex-ante, Free entry
condition implies that expectation of future profits pi conditional on successful entry
must be equal to the fixed costs of entry fEi . Net value of entry v(ϕ) at time (t = 0)
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given the probability of dying in each period δ is
v(ϕ) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)tpi − fEi
]
=
1−G(ϕ∗)
δ
pi − fEi (2.25)
According to the free entry condition, firms will enter until the net value of entry is
driven to zero. Market shares of firms shrink as more firms enter the market until
expected profits equal cost of entry.
Where the average revenues and profits across all domestic firms earned from both
domestic, export and FDI revenues are given as:
r = piiD ˜(ϕ) + nθEXrEX
˜(ϕ) + nθMF rMF
˜(ϕ) (2.26)
Now taking into account the zero profit condition the above equation becomes
r = σ(pi + fiD + nθEXfEX + nθMF fMF ) (2.27)
pi = piiD ˜(ϕ) + nθEXpiEX
˜(ϕ) + nθMF piMF
˜(ϕ) (2.28)
These average Profits pin down the equilibrium mass of incumbent firms given as
N =
R
r
=
L
σ(pi + fDi + nθEXfEX + nθMF fMF
) (2.29)
2.3.2 Labour Market clearing condition
The labour market clearing condition requires that total labour demand in domestic
market equal labour total labour supply, i.e aggregate revenue (derived from consumers
total expenditure on d differentiated goods) equal total payments to labour L. We then
use the labour market clearing condition to solve for the mass of firms. The labour
market clearing conditions implies that total labour used for production and the entry
cost must equal total labour endowment.We get the following expression for the mass of
firms:
Ni =
Li(σ − 1)(ϕ/ϕii)k
kσfEi
(2.30)
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2.3.3 Aggregation of Sales
We consider aggregation of export and FDI sales in order to determine the intensive and
extensive margins.
Export sales
The approach is to multiply the probability of export conditional on successful entry by
the export revenues.
XEXij =
G(ϕ∗MF )−G(ϕ∗EX )
1−G(ϕ∗i )
Ni

∞∫
ϕ
EX
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1wiτij)
1−σβ
Yj
P 1−σj
dG(ϕEXij )
 (2.31)
Solving the integral and substituting for the export cut-off productivity yields the follow-
ing decomposition for total exports into intensive and extensive margins (see appendix
for derivations);
XEXij =
(
ϕmin
ϕEX
)k
NEX︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive
(
σk
k − σ + 1
)
fEXwi︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive
(2.32)
At the extensive margins we have the number of firms that supply foreign market via
exports and at the intensive margins we have the average sales of operating exporting
firms. The effect of a change in trade costs on export sales also yields extensive and
intensive margins as Chaney (2008) who has a complete exposition of the derivations);
dlnXEXij
dlnτij
= − (σ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive
− (k − σ + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive
(2.33)
The same observations as Chaney (2008) holds, i.e., intensive margins are more sensitive
to change in trade barriers and the extensive margins are less sensitive. Consider a
situation where the elasticity of substitution is high, this implies tough competition
between firms. Lowering trade barriers will induce new and less productive firms to
enter, but low productivities implies that they are at a cost disadvantage translating into
smaller market share. Consequently these low productive firms have a smaller impact on
aggregate trade. However if elasticity of substitution is very low, competition is low and
new entrants can capture larger market resulting in larger impact on aggregate trade.
Therefore, higher elasticity of substitution magnifies sensitivity of intensive margins to
changes in trade costs, but sensitivity of extensive margins is less.
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FDI or Multinational Sales
We proceed by multiplying the probability of entry into foreign market via FDI with
revenues accrued from FDI, we get the following gravity equation
XMFij =
1−G(ϕ∗MF )
1−G(ϕ∗i )
Ni

∞∫
ϕ
MF
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1)
1−σ[(Ωijτij)γ(σ−1) − 1](wijτij)1−σβ Yj
P 1−σj
dG(ϕMFij )

(2.34)
Solving the integral and substituting for the FDI productivity cut-off, we get t he fol-
lowing decomposition of extensive and intensive margins of FDI (see appendix);
XMFij =
(
ϕmin
ϕMF
)k
NMF︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive
(
σk
k − σ + 1
)
wj(fMF − fEX )︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive
(2.35)
In the same frame of mind as Irarrazabal et al. (2013), the derivation of the overall
effect of a change in variable trade barriers on total affiliate sales can be decomposed
into intensive and extensive margins as;
dlnXMFij
dlnτij
= − (1− γ)(σ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive
− (k − σ + 1)χMF︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive
(2.36)
Where χMF is defined as the elasticity of FDI cut-off to variable trade barriers.
χMF =
(Ωijτij)
γ(σ−1)(γ − 1)− 1
(Ωijτij)γ(σ−1) − 1
(2.37)
In the case of FDI, the sensitivity of intensive margins to changes in trade barriers arises
due to the intermediate inputs which are traded from country of origin of the foreign
affiliate. The presence of this intra-firm trade implies that total FDI sales are inversely
related to trade costs. At the extensive margins, higher trade costs leads to reduction
in total FDI (multinational) sales. A higher elasticity of substitution in the presence of
low trade costs induces new firms to enter foreign market via FDI provided they meet
the cut-off productivity level of FDI. The higher elasticity of substitution implies fierce
competition. Lower productivities of those which meet the cut-off FDI productivity
implies that they are at a cost disadvantage and only capture a small portion of the
market, hence the impact of these low productivity firms on FDI sales is very small.
However, a decrease in elasticity of substitution implies less competition and new FDI
entrant firms can capture large market size with a large impact on FDI sales.
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Aggregate Sales (from all operations, i.e both exports and FDI)
Aggregate sales from all operations are therefore a sum of the total ex port(trade) and
FDI (multinational) sales, given by;
X−kij = Ni
k
k − σ + 1
(
Yj
P 1−σj
)1− k
σ−1 ( σ
σ − 1wiτij)
)−k
(σwj)
1− k
σ−1 x(
f
1− k
σ−1
EX
+ (
fMF − fEX
(Ωijτij)γ(σ−1) − 1
)1−
k
σ−1
) (2.38)
Aggregation of Price Index
We define aggregate price, but decompose it into export price index and FDI price index
(derivations in the appendix). This is to facilitate the derivation of the total welfare gains
which we define in the proceeding section.
2.3.3.1 Trade only Price Index
PEXj =
G(ϕ∗MF )−G(ϕ∗EX )
1−G(ϕ∗i )
Ni

∞∫
ϕ
EX
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1wijτij)
1−σdG(ϕij)

1
1−σ
(2.39)
Evaluating the integral and substituting for cut-off productivities
P−kj = NEX
k
k − σ + 1
(
1
Yj
)1− k
σ−1
ϕkmin
(
σ
σ − 1wiτij
)−k
(σwjfEX ))
1− k
σ−1 (2.40)
FDI only Price Index
PMFij =
1−G(ϕ∗MF )
1−G(ϕ∗i )
Ni

∞∫
ϕ
MF
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1)
1−σ[(Ωijτij)γ(σ−1) − 1](wijτij)1−σdG(ϕij)

1
1−σ
(2.41)
Evaluating the integral and substituting for cut-off productivities
P−kj = NMF
k
k − σ + 1
(
1
Yj
)1− k
σ−1
ϕkmin
(
σ
σ − 1wiτij
)−k (
σwj(
fMF − fEX
(Ωijτij)γ(σ−1) − 1
)
)1− k
σ−1
(2.42)
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. Aggregate price index from all operations are therefore a sum of the total export(trade)
and FDI(multinational) price indices, given by;
P 1−σij =
G(ϕ∗MF )−G(ϕ∗EX )
1−G(ϕ∗i )
Ni

∞∫
ϕ
EX
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1wijτij)
1−σdG(ϕij)

+
1−G(ϕ∗MF )
1−G(ϕ∗i )
Ni

∞∫
ϕ
MF
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1)
1−σ[(Ωijτij)γ(σ−1) − 1](wijτij)1−σdG(ϕij)

Evaluating the Integral and substituting for the cut off productivities
P−kj =Ni
k
k − σ + 1
(
1
Yj
)1− k
σ−1
(
σ
σ − 1(wiτij)
)−k
(σwj)
1− k
σ−1
x
(
f(EX )
1− k
σ−1 + (
fMF − fEX
(Ωijτij)γ(σ−1) − 1
)1−
k
σ−1
) (2.43)
2.4 Welfare Analysis
We are interested in the aggregate effects of trade and FDI on the welfare measure.
Welfare is given by the per capita value of real income accruing to consumers. Welfare
depends on real labour income derived from export and foreign multinational affiliates
in the domestic market and revenues generated by home country firms set up in foreign
countries, this welfare measure is given given by:
Wj =
wj
Pj
(2.44)
This shows that the welfare depends on the wage level in country j and the aggregate
price index of both trade and fdi Pj . In the following section we will derive the expen-
diture shares of both trade and FDI as they facilitate the computation of the welfare
measure.
Expenditure Shares
Country j’s welfare is expressed by Arkolakis et al. (2012) as a function of the share
of expenditure that falls on domestically produced goods(which is equal to 1 minus the
import penetration ratio. This share, λjj under autarky is 1 ,therefore total size of gains
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from openness will be equal to 1−λj .In the considered trade models (Armington (1969)
,Eaton and Kortum (2002b), and Melitz (2003)), the change in real income associated
with a change in iceberg trade costs with only trade and without FDI is computed as:
Wˆ = λˆ
− 1
ε
jj (2.45)
We proceed to derive change in real income associated with change in trade costs in an
environment of both trade and FDI. First we determine the expenditure shares of total
income of country j spent on foreign varieties, we give separate expositions of trade and
FDI shares and finally the aggregate share on all foreign varies(both imports and FDI).
Trade Share (Income spent on Imports)
We present here an expression of total fraction of income of country j spent on goods
from country i (trade shares) as a function of wages and labour allocated in each country
and parameters(see appendix for derivations)
λEXij =
(Li/fiE)ϕ
k
mini
w
−
(
kσ−(σ−1)
σ−1
)
i (τij)
−kf
1− k
σ−1
ijEX∑
v
(Lvj/fvE)ϕkminvw
−
(
kσ−(σ−1)
σ−1
)
v (τvj)−kf
1− k
σ−1
vj
(2.46)
FDI Expenditure Share
This is the total income spent on goods supplied by multinationals in the host country
(see appendix for derivations)
λMFij =
(Li/fiE)ϕ
k
mini
w
−
(
kσ−(σ−1)
σ−1
)
i (τij)
−k(fMF − fEX )1−
k
σ−1 (Ωvjτij)
γ(σ−1) − 1)1− kσ−1∑
v
(Lvj/fvE)ϕkminvw
−
(
kσ−(σ−1)
σ−1
)
v (τvj)−k(fMF − fEX )
1− k
σ−1
vj (Ωvjτvj)
γ(σ−1) − 1)1− kσ−1
(2.47)
In both the trade and FDI share, the exponent on the wages differs from the exponent
on trade costs due to the assumption that fixed exporting costs are incurred in terms of
labour in the source country. The aggregate expenditure share on all foreign varieties is
given by adding the last two expressions for trade (2.46) and FDI (2.47) expenditures.
These expenditure share expressions are then used to write the generalised welfare for-
mula in equation (2.44) as a function of expenditure shares and elasticities. Under Pareto
assumption knowing a country’s domestic share of trade and FDI and shape parameter
of the productivity distribution k is sufficient to determine welfare gains from openness.
To achieve this, we first write the export price index in equation (40) and FDI price
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index in equation (42) as a function of country j’s share of trade(FDI) with itself, its
export(FDI) wage, the export(FDI) labour allocation and parameters.
Welfare derived from Trade
Wj =
(
wj
Pj
)
=
[(
σ
σ − 1
)−k
σ−
k
σ−1 σ − 1
k − σ + 1ϕ
k
minjf
1− k
σ−1
EX
fE
] 1
k
(Lj)
1
σ−1 (λj)
− 1
k (2.48)
Gains from trade are given by,(the domestic trade shares in the closed economy are fixed
at λclosed = 1):
Wˆj =
W openj
W closedj
= λˆ
− 1
k
j (2.49)
5In a similar manner a change in welfare can be expressed as a function of domestic
expenditure on FDI as
Total Welfare(Gains from Openness)
W ∗j =
(
wj
Pj
)
=
[(
σ
σ − 1
)−k
σ−
k
σ−1
σ − 1
k − σ + 1ϕ
k
minj(
(fMF − fEX )1−
k
σ−1 [Ωjγ(σ−1) − 1]1− kσ−1 + f1−
k
σ−1
EX
)
f−1jE
] 1
k
(Lj)
1
σ−1
(
λ
1
γ
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+ λEX
)− 1
k
Country j’s gains from openness is given by;
Wˆj =
(
λ
1
γ
MF
+ λEX
)− 1
k
(2.50)
.
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2.5 Quantitative Relevance: Theory to Data
As a final step in this chapter, we examine the quantitative relevance of our results, we
compare the welfare properties of the trade only set up as in Arkolakis et al. (2012)
and intra-firm trade within the multinationals firms. We choose standard values for
the heterogeneous firm model’s parameters based on central estimates from the existing
empirical literature. Our starting point is to specify values for the intermediate input
share (1 − γ) and elasticity of substitution σ and the shape parameter of the Pareto
distribution k and the share of expenditure on domestically produced goods λj . We
limit this quantitative analysis to the U.S. as the data on USA parent firms and their
foreign affiliates are readily and publicly available on the BEA (Bureau of Economic
Analysis) website.
We quickly point out that to obtain estimates for the shape parameter and trade elastic-
ity parameters we would need data on iceberg trade costs and tariffs. In the cases of the
Armington (1969), Krugman (1980) and Eaton and Kortum (2002a)) models, one would
estimate a gravity equation under the assumption ε = k, in the Melitz (2003) case, we
have ε 6= k. This implies that an estimation exercise of the gravity equation will have
to be carried out. At the objective of this paper is not concerned with the estimation
of trade elasticities or other model parameters, we acknowledge that this is not a trivial
exercise. The goal of this paper is to shed light on the total gains from trade and FDI
in order to enable comparison with the quantitative exercise of Arkolakis et al. (2012).
The share of domestic expenditure under autarky would be equal to one, this implies
that the total size of the gains from trade, defined as the absolute value of the percentage
change in real income as we move from the observed equilibrium to autarky, is 1− λ−1ε
for trade only gains; 1− λ −1ε(1−γ) for FDI (intra-firm trade) only gains and. In Arkolakis
et al. (2012), the calculations of the import penetration ratios are based on the 2006
edition of the OECD Input-Output Database: as imports over gross output (rather than
GDP), so that they can be interpreted as a share of (gross) total expenditures allocated
to imports. There is a difference in these two approaches; using gross outputs includes
intermediate imports while using GDP would not include imported intermediates. We
use OECD Stan database for gross outputs.
Using the BEA data base we extract intra firm exports of intermediate inputs from U.S.
parent firms to their affiliates abroad (U.S. Exports of Goods Shipped by U.S. Parents to
Foreign Affiliates) for the year 2009. The BEA estimates cover the universe of non-bank
U.S. affiliates of foreign companies. From this data set we are able to distinguish both
export level of US parent to its affiliates in the destination countries and import level
from affiliates to the Parent. We adopt the BEA definition of U.S. direct investment
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abroad as Ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one U.S. person, or entity, of
10 percent or more of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign business enterprise
or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign business enterprise. A limitation
of this quantitative analysis is data restrictions due on affiliate intra-firm trade, the
BEA data set only focuses on U.S. affiliate and parent firms data. An inoculation to
this data challenge is to use imports by U.S. parents from their foreign affiliates as an
approximation for affiliates intra-firm trade activities in the U.S.
For arm’s length export data we use the OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database (BT-
DIxE) which provides values of imports and exports of goods. BTDIxE was designed
to extend the BTD database which provided bilateral trade in goods by industry only.
We then proceed to deduct the intra firm trade values from the total trade values ob-
tained in order to determine the arm’s length trade values. We then assign the shape
parameter of the Pareto distribution. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) offer a review
studies that offer gravity-based estimates for the trade elasticity all within the range of
-5 and -10. Simonovska and Waugh (2014) estimate a trade elasticity of 4.10 or 4.27
depending on the data used. Any of these values would lead to quantitatively similar
results. Concerning the share if intermediate goods used, we take the value 13 which is
the most widely used in trade literature.
In the table below we compare the gains from arm’s length trade, intra firm trade and
total gains for the U.S. Here the gains from openness is the total gains from trade and
FDI. The last column is the percentage point difference between the gains from openness
and the gains from trade in the fashion of Arkolakis et al. (2012)
Gains from Openness in the U.S. for the year 2009
Parameters Gains (Arkolakis
et al. (2012))
FDI (Intra Firm
Trade) Gains
Gains from
Openness
% point In-
crease
k = 4, γ = 1/3 3% 11% 14% 11%
k = 4, γ = 1/2 3% 12% 15% 12%
k = 10, γ = 1/3 1% 5 % 6,00% 4%
k = 10, γ = 1/2 1% 5,1% 6,10% 5%
The results in this table indicate that the total gains from openness rise with the share
of intermediate goods used in the multinational affiliates. With trade elasticity of 4,
when the intermediate share is 1/3 the gains from trade in the spirit of Arkolakis et al.
(2012) is 3% while the gains from openness is 11% the difference between our set up
(gains from trade and multinational firm intra firm trade ) and the trade only gains in
the set up by Arkolakis et al. (2012) is 8%. When we increased the trade elasticity to 10
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keeping the intermediate good shares constant at 1/3 the differences in the gains from
openness and trade only gains was 3%. In the second case where the intermediate input
share is 1/2, the difference was given by is 9% when the elasticity of trade is 10. At
both trade elasticities for the same input shares we observe higher gains from openness
than in the set up with only trade gains as in Arkolakis et al. (2012). This shows that
intra-firm trade of intermediate inputs within the multinational firm is an important
source of trade gains that cannot be ignored.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have revisited the welfare gains from trade for new trade models in
the presence of multinational firm production. Provided there are positive marginal cost
savings and positive profits from multinational firm production, we get additional gains
from FDI. Therefore omission of FDI via intra-firm trade if intermediate good inputs
underestimates gains from openness relative to autarky. We anticipate that the bias is
largest in economies characterized by high intra-firm trade between parent firms and
their foreign affiliates, mostly developed countries.
The multinational affiliates used intermediate inputs provided via intra firm trade, this
gives us insights about the interaction of trade and multinational firms. Whenever γ = 1,
there is no intra-firm trade of intermediate goods hence trade and FDI are substitutes
as in the case of Helpman et al. (2004)in which FDI was favoured whenever trade costs
are high(tariff-jumping). However when γ = 0, an increase in trade barriers leads to
costly intra-firm firm trade of affiliates hence, affiliate profits diminish. Therefore for
low values of γ, accessing foreign markets via FDI is most preferred, for high values of
γ firm will access foreign market via exports.
We carried out a quantitative analysis to verify the analytical results we obtained in
what could otherwise be thought of as the decomposition of the Arkolakis et al. (2012)
measure of trade taking into account intra-firm trade of intermediate inputs within the
multinational firm. We find ou that the total gains from openness rise with the share
of intermediate goods used in the multinational affiliates. With trade elasticity of 4,
the difference between our set up (gains from trade and multinational intra firm trade)
and the trade only gains in the set up by Arkolakis et al. (2012) is 8%. When we
increased the trade elasticity to 10 keeping the intermediate good shares constant at 1/3
the differences in the gains from openness and trade only gains was 3%. We conclude
to state that multinational intra firm trade is an important channel of trade gains, and
interaction of the trade elasticity and the intermediate good input share in our set up
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accounts for this increase in the trade gains as compared to the result of Arkolakis et al.
(2012)
In this framework there is a positive correlation between the trade elasticity parame-
ter and the intermediate good input share, hence gains from intra firm trade(FDI) are
affected by both γ and ε. For higher productivity dispersions, the percentage point
differences are higher between the gains from openness in our study and the gains from
trade as calculated in the fashion of Arkolakis et al. (2012) and for higher intermedi-
ate good inputs, and for the same productivity dispersion the percentage differences in
the gains are lower for low intermediate good input. It is important to note that the
trade elasticity parameter used in this study was average for all sectors. As argued by
Ossa (2015), average sectoral parameter underestimate total gains from trade, therefore
an interesting direction of future research will be to consider different sectoral elastici-
ties and different input shares by sector. Of course this depends on the availability of
disaggregated data per sector per destination country of intra-firm trade.
Chapter 3
Capital Taxation, Heterogeneous
Multinational and Trade Firms in
a Model of Endogenous
productivity Growth
3.1 Introduction
Fiscal policy affects the location decisions of firms and plays an important role in stim-
ulating innovation led growth through its effects on investment in research and de-
velopment (R&D) activities. Countries face a dilemma in determining tax policies to
maximize the benefits of trade and FDI such as productivity growth, and stable funding
for investment. As an example, emerging market and developing economies often imple-
ment tax holidays or tax exemptions in special economic zones to attract more FDI and
promote trade. However, these incentives erode tax bases, most notably of the corpo-
rate income tax. A vast amount of economics literature confirms that various types of
investment activity or the location of corporate investments and profits are responsive
to differences in countries tax regimes.
It is well documented that statutory corporation tax rates have been falling across the
G7 economies. This decline shows some evidence of convergence to main rates of between
30% and 40%. Econometric evidence points out that the main reasons of declining corpo-
rate taxes is the international tax competition for mobile capital and firms, particularly
in Europe. In a panel regression of the impact of tax structures on economic growth,
Arnold (2008) used a sample of firm-level data for 21 OECD countries over 1996-2004
29
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to find out whether firms incurring higher corporate tax rates shows any lower levels of
total factor productivity and investment compared to firms facing lower corporate tax
rates. Further studies on the impact of corporate taxation on investments is captured
on an empirical investigation by Schwellnus and Arnold (2008) who asserted that; firstly
high corporate taxes may reduce incentives for productivity-enhancing innovations by
reducing their post-tax returns; secondly, high corporate taxes may reduce incentives for
risk taken by firms with negative consequences for productivity; thirdly high corporate
taxes may reduce incentives to invest in physical capital by increasing the user cost of
capital.
Arnold et al. (2011) provide strong evidence that firms in less profitable industries are
affected differently to those in more profitable ones, they are unable to assess whether the
overall effect of corporate taxation on productivity growth is positive, negative or zero.
Up until that paper, the productivity effects of taxation on firm behaviour had usually
been inferred from their effects on indirect channels such as R&D and capital investment.
According to Bernard et al. (2007) firms - even in a narrowly defined sector - differ vastly
in their size and productivity. This empirically observed heterogeneity has become a core
element of recent theoretical and empirical research in various fields of economics and
international trade literature based on the seminal theoretical contribution by Melitz
(2003). It is therefore very clear that, the heterogeneity of firms is also relevant to the
design of corporate tax policies across countries. The existing theoretical literature on
international corporate taxation has largely been confined to settings where all firms are
identical. Even though there are several findings in the literature on the relationship
between firm size, growth and innovation, however none have investigated how these
are affected by corporate taxes. Against this background the focus of this chapter is to
study the link between heterogeneous multinational and trade firms, innovation and the
consequent productivity growth implications in the presence of corporate taxes. The
eminent importance of such a study is further highlighted by Chu et al. (2015), who
stated that it would be interesting to study the relationships among innovation, growth,
and taxes using an R&D-based endogenous growth model proposed by Romer (1990),
Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1998), as will be the approach
in this chapter.
There are several strands of literature at the nexus of trade and public finance that
derive optimal tax policies in models with heterogeneous firms. Pflu¨ger and Su¨dekum
(2013) analyse optimal equilibrium subsidies to market entry in an open economy model
of policy competition. Davies and Eckel (2010) analyse tax rate competition for interna-
tionally mobile, heterogeneous firms, whereas Krautheim and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011)
derive Nash equilibrium tax rates when the location of firms is fixed but profits can be
shifted between countries. These papers, however, focus on tax rate competition and do
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not endogenise the simultaneous determination of productivity growth led by innovation
activities, corporate taxation and investment decisions. In addition these papers only
pay attention to static steady states and gives no intuition on dynamic analysis of the
effects of corporate taxation on productivity growth as they take productivity to be
exogenously given.
We present an extended version of the model of Helpman et al. (2004) with firm het-
erogeneity and trade with steady-state productivity growth driven by innovation in the
spirit of Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010). They set up a model of heterogeneous firm
productivity embedded in an R&D led endogenous growth model without scale effects.
Previous works in new trade theory and growth has featured scale effects which are
proved to be at odds with empirics for example, Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008). In
the model developed by Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008), the steady-state produc-
tivity growth rate is an increasing function of population size, which implies that larger
economies should grow faster. This strong scale effect property is present in all early
R&D-driven endogenous growth models, including Grossman and Helpman (1991), but
it is clearly at odds with empirical evidence. As Jones (1995) has pointed out, there have
been no upward trends in the productivity growth rates of the United States, France,
Germany or Japan since 1950 in spite of substantial increases in population size and
R&D employment. In response to this critique, a variety of R&D-driven growth models
have been developed that do not have the strong scale effect property, including Jones
(1995), Segerstrom (1998) and Howitt (1999).
Based on the model in this study, we find out that high corporate taxes may reduce
incentives for productivity-enhancing innovations by reducing their post-tax returns.
Moreover we find out that higher corporate taxes raise the interest rate and lowers the
fraction of workers in the innovation sector. There are however competing effects of
taxation on the output. The rest of this paper is organised as follows, section [3.2]
presents the setup of the theoretical model and the assumptions used, section [3.3]
presents the solution of the model and the results in the form of propositions, finally
section [3.4] presents the main conclusions of the paper.
3.2 Theoretical model of trade and FDI with firms hetero-
geneity, innovation-led growth and corporate taxation
3.2.1 Model Setup and Assumptions
We set up a heterogeneous productivity model of trade and FDI in the same spirit as
Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004). The production structure in the economy is
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set up in a similar manner to Jones (1995). The endogenous growth approach without
scale effects is in the spirit of Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010), i.e the growth rate
along the balanced growth path is not an increasing function of population size. Jones
(1995) argued that the presence of strong scale effects is at odds with time series data
suggesting that Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) is superior from empirical point of
view.
House-holds and Labour Supply
The economy of each country comprises of a fixed measure of households L ≡ L(0) with
an infinite horizon. Initially each household has one member, but the household size
grows at an exogenously given exponential rate n, hence at every point in time there
is L(t) = L(0)ent individuals. Each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labour
(there is no dis-utility from work) meaning that labour/leisure trade off does not enter
the preferences. Labour is employed either in the production of final good LY (t) , or in
innovation LI(t). We assume perfect mobility of labour across sectors in the economy
but not across countries such that wages are equal in the R&D and final good sector.
The reward for labour is the wages wt. Preferences are identical across individuals and
households. Consumer preferences are similar in both countries and household maximize
infinite lifetime utility, taking the growing number of household members into account,
the inter-temporal utility of the household is defined by;
U =
∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ−n)t
C
1− 1
ζ
it − 1
1− 1ζ
dt (3.1)
where ρ is the rate of time preference, ζ denotes the inverse of the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution, Cit is the consumption of the final good. Household income
comprises of labour income, interest payments on assets of the household and profits
from firms in the intermediate goods sector. These incomes sums up to the out produced
Y. The income is used for consumption and investment undertaken by firms in the
intermediate good sector. Therefore household maximises infinite time horizon utility
(3.1) subject to an inter-temporal budget constraint
˙v(t) = w(t) + ((1− τv)r(t)− n)vt − c(t) + T (3.2)
such that w denotes the wage rate, r denotes the interest rate(pre-tax return on assets), v
denotes the assets, n is the growth rate of population, T denotes transfers from the gov-
ernment, τv denotes the tax rate for asset income. Whereby the following transversality
condition holds
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lim
t←∞ vtexp
{
−
∫ t
0
((1− τv)rs − n)ds
}
≥ 0 (3.3)
The above equation is the usual or standard household’s no Ponzi game condition, that is
fulfilled for a time path on which assets grow at the same rate as consumption, necessary
conditions are also sufficient.
Government
The government in our economy receives tax revenues from capital income taxes. In this
model we abstract from neither government spending nor public provision of services,
i.e., government spending neither enhances welfare nor raises production possibilities
on the economy. The reason for that assumption is that we neglect any distortions
resulting from variations in government spending. Inclusion of public capital in the
production function would have consequences on the productivity growth, however we
want to explain productivity growth effects of innovation without a parallel mechanism
that affects productivity growth of the factors used. The Ricardian equivalence holds;
that is, government taxation does not affect household decisions. We also assume that
the government rebates all the taxation revenues immediately to the households, hence
it is not important to monitor the asset position of the government. Therefore we make
an underlying simplifying assumption that government collects taxes and returns them
as lump sum to households. The per period budget constraint of the government is given
by:
τvr(t)v(t) = T (t) (3.4)
Innovation
New varieties are introduced by R&D and innovation i.e., firms first employ researchers
to develop a new variety. Firms generate knowledge by carrying out innovations, it takes
bI(t) units of labour to generate one unit of knowledge. Assuming identical production
functions in producing intermediate varieties in the same spirit as Baldwin and Robert-
Nicoud (2008) an entrant is required to hire bIFI workers and pay the associated wage
bill wbIFI . The fixed costs of innovation FI measures the strength of barriers to entry.
Expected value of the firm is equal to total innovation cost. Free entry condition implies
that when there are positive profits, more firms enter into research and development of
blue prints for intermediate goods thereby driving down the value of innovation until
profits are set to zero. The basic set up of the innovation is adopted from Gustafsson
and Segerstrom (2010).
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Recall that it takes bI units of labour to generate one unit of knowledge. Then bI is
treated as a parameter by firms but it can change over time due to knowledge spillovers.
bI(t) =
L(t)κ
(MD(t) + λMF (t))φLI(t)θ−1
(3.5)
where MD and MF are the number of varieties produced in the home and the foreign
countries. Symmetry implies that MD(t) = MF (t) = Mt, where Mt is the total number
of varieties produced in each economy. Therefore we can re write (3.5) as:
bI(t) =
L(t)κ
(1 + λ)φMφt LI(t)
θ−1 (3.6)
where L(t) is the total labour endowment in the economy, LI(t) is the labour devoted
to production of new blue prints in the innovation process λ ∈ [0, 1] is the intensity of
international knowledge spillovers. λ = 0 corresponds to no international spillovers and
λ = 1 corresponds to perfect international spillovers. The parameter φ < 1 is an R&D
parameter that measures the strength of inter-temporal knowledge spillovers, if φ = 0
then there are no inter-temporal knowledge spillovers, if φ > 0 researchers experience
standing on the shoulders of giants effect and benefit from past innovations and become
more productive in creating new knowledge as the stock of knowledge increases. For the
case φ < 0 researchers become less productive in creating new knowledge, they face the
fishing out of ideas effect.
Intermediate Goods Sector
We consider intermediate good producers with heterogeneous productivities, this is a
point of departure from endogenous growth literature which usually assumes homoge-
neous technologies between producers in the intermediate goods sector. There is a large
pool of potential entrants into this sector and each potential entrant faces sunk costs of
F. After obtaining a blue print, each firm draws firm specific marginal costs ai from a
stationary Pareto distribution
Gi(a) = Pr(a < a) =
∫ a
0
g(a)da =
(
a
ai0
)ki
, a ∈ [o, ai0] (3.7)
where the shape parameter is denoted by k and the scale of the distribution is denoted
ai0. This distribution relates firm productivity and firm size. When the shape parameter
is lower firms are more heterogeneous,i.e there exists an inverse relationship between
heterogeneity and the shape parameter k. For the mean and variance of the distribution
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to be finite we assume that k > 0. There is only one chance for an intermediate firm to
draw the unit cost parameter and it remains the same there after.
Essentially potential intermediate producers decide on devotion of resources to develop
intermediate goods. Then the firms draws its costs and decide whether to supply the
domestic market or foreign market via trade and FDI. Consider a firm that develops
a new variety at time t, let aD be the unit labour requirement that is incurred by
a firm that is indifferent between incurring the fixed costs bIFD of serving only the
domestic market and immediately shutting down production process. Let aEX be the
marginal costs that a firm incurs if it decided to serve the foreign market via exports
with additional fixed costs of bIFEX and, let aEM be the marginal cost that the firm
incur when it decides to access the foreign market via FDI with additional fixed costs
of bIFEM
To guarantee non negative average net profits for MNEs, the per period fixed costs Fcit,
c ∈ {d, x, j} satisfies the following condition:
Ωj
Ωi
Fiit < τ
Fxit < Fjit ∀i ∈ {i, j}, j 6= i (3.8)
An intermediate firm has monopoly over production of its variety, that is, it is advanta-
geous for each firm to produce a distinct variety and charge a monopoly price instead of
entering into direct competition with other firms by manufacturing an identical variety.
As production does not feature economies of scope (fixed costs has to be paid per va-
riety), firms will not produce more than one variety. Assuming that there ia free entry
into consumption good production the result is a well known monopolistic competition
market structure.
Final Goods Sector
The final out put Y is produced using labour and a continuum of intermediate goods.
This production function is analogous to that of Romer (1990);
Yt = AL
1−Φ
Yt
∫
ω∈Ω
xt(ω)
Φdω, 0 ≤ Φ < 1, (3.9)
where LYt denotes labour employed in the final good production. A > 0 denotes a
measure of exogenous aggregate productivity which is non R&D driven. The set of
available intermediate goods is denoted Ω and xt(ω) is the quantity of intermediate
variety ω. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is given by  = 11−Φ .
The final good is treated as the numeraire and sold at unit price, i.e PYt = 1, for purposes
of this analysis we assume that the final good is non tradable.
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3.3 Solution of the model
In this section I present the solution of the model, I describe equilibrium properties
that hold. We first define the decentralized equilibrium is a sequence of allocations
{ct,K, Y, L, LY LI , x,G}∞t=0 and prices {pit, wt, rt}∞t=0 and policy {τv} such that for all t ;
1. households maximize their lifetime utility, i.e., ct, vt solves the household problem
2. competitive final goods firms choose {xit}N0 andLY to maximize profits taking
prices as given.
3. LIt solves the research and development firm problem taking V,w as given
4. Kt satisfies
∫ Nt
0 xitdi = Kt
5. Yt =
(
L1−ΦY
∫ Nt
0 x
Φ
it
)
6. wt clears the labour market; LI(t) + LY (t) = L(t)
7. rt clears the capital markets
8. Lt = L0e
nt
9. the government budget constraint is balanced i.e., τvr(t)v(t) = T
10. Monopolistic intermediate good firms maximize their profits by choosing {pit}Niti=0
3.3.1 Household optimization problem
Inter-temporal maximisation of lifetime utility (3.1) by a representative house old subject
to the budget constraint (3.2) yields the standard Euler equation which shows consump-
tion growth rate as the depending on the difference between the interest rate r and the
rate of time preference ρ.
˙cit
cit
= ζ((1− τv)r − ρ) (3.10)
The households of all countries have equal access to an international financial market,
leading to a common interest rate across countries, and common motions for the evo-
lution of household expenditure defined by equation (3.10) above. Output growth is
driven by growth of inputs and technology.
gY = n+ g (3.11)
This implies that the growth rate of output and capital in steady state does not depend
on tax rates. This is one of the distinguishing features with endogenous growth models
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of Romer and Frankel (1999), Grossman and Helpman (1991) which all indicates that
strong scale effects so that growth rate may be influenced by tax rates. Since capital
grows at the same rate as consumption and output, capital income taxes do not affect
balanced growth rate of consumption. The growth rate of consumption is given by;
gc =
c˙t
ct
= ζ((1− τv)rt − ρ)
→ gY − n
r∗ =
g
ζ + ρ
1− τv
(3.12)
This equation shows that the steady state interest rate depends on the tax rate applied
to capital income.Higher capital income taxes raises the interest rate. Higher interest
rates lower the present value of future profits.
3.3.2 Intermediate good sector Profit maximization
A firm with cost a(ω) from country i maximizes its operating profits by choosing its
optimal price pci for c ∈ {D,EX , EM} to serve the domestic and foreign markets via
export and multinational firms respectively. The firm problem is given by;
max
pci(ω)
(pci(ω)− τ za(ω))xci(p(ci)) (3.13)
where z ∈ {0, 1} such that z = 0 in the case of domestic and multinational firms and
z = 1 in the case of exporting firms with iceberg trade costs of τ . The optimal prices
for country i firm to serve the domestic market, export and set up horizontal MNE is
thus given by the following respectively;
pDi =
a(ω)
Φ
pEXi =
τa(ω)
Φ
pEMi =
a(ω)
Φ
The above prices are constant mark-ups over the marginal costs. Now substituting the
prices into the profit equation given by (3.13) together with the demand given by (C.1)
yield optimal profit;
pici =
(
1− Φ
Φ
)
(τ za(ω))
−Φ
1−ΦA
1
1−Φ
i Φ
2
1−ΦLd (3.14)
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3.3.3 Final Good Profit Maximization
We assume a perfectly competitive final goods market, therefore marginal products
are rewards for the factors used in production of the final good. From the first order
conditions we determine the (factor prices) wages and the price of the intermediate
goods;
∂Yt
∂Lt
= wt = 1− ΦL1−ΦYt
∫
ω∈Ωt
xt(ω)
Φdω =
(1− Φ)Yt
LYt
, 0 < Φ < 1 (3.15)
∂dYt
∂dXt
= p(ω) = ΦL1−ΦYt (xt(ω))
Φ−1 → ΦYt = KtPt (3.16)
where the wages are denoted by wt and the price is denoted by p(ω) for the good ω.
Since we consider monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods sector, the price
in (3.16) is not affected by price settings of other intermediate good producers. We have
that Kt =
∫
ω∈Ω x(ω)d(ω) and Pij =
(∫
ω∈Ω p
1−
ij dω
) 1
1−
is the price index of the economy.
Summing over the differentiated input varieties we obtain the aggregate price index
associated with the intermediate sector:
Pit =
 ∑
i=H,F
∫
ω
p(ω)1−σ
 11−σ (3.17)
Note that the price of final good is taken as the numeraire this implies that:(
w
1− Φ
)1−Φ(P
Φ
)Φ
= PY = 1 (3.18)
Equation (3.15) implies that the wages can be written as:
wt = A
− 1
1−Φ (1− Φ)Φ Φ1−ΦP
−Φ
1−Φ
t (3.19)
subsequently Equations (3.15), (3.19) implies that:
Yt = A
− 1
1−Φ Φ
Φ
1−ΦP (t)
−Φ
1−ΦLY (t) (3.20)
Final good producers decide on the optimal amount of the intermediate inputs, taking
prices of the intermediate goods as given. Solving the maximisation problem yields home
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country’s demand for variety ω;
x(ω) =
p(ω)−
P 1−
ΦYt with P =
(∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)1−d(ω)
)− 1
1−
(3.21)
Where p(ω) is the price of variety ω, taking into account the distribution function of pro-
ductivity levels of the firms we can re-write the price index as P =
(∫∞
ϕ p(ϕ)
1−dG(ϕ)
) 1
1−
.
3.3.4 Entry and Exit Decisions
Cut-off Productivity Levels
First it is important to note that in contrast to the model of Melitz (2003) who assumes
an exogenous death rate for all firms to enable steady state transitions in response to
trade, we employ the notion of innovation to facilitate transition between steady states.
Assume that entrant’s entry costs are financed by issuing equities. The return on these
equities is given by the usual arbitrage condition. Denoting pij(a) the instantaneous
profits of the firm j
Vjt(a) =
∫ ∞
t
e−r¯(s−t)pijt(a)ds (3.22)
where r¯ =
∫ s
t r(ν) denotes the cumulative interest rate up to the time s ≥ t, Vjt(a) is
the market value of firm j. Differentiating (3.22) with respect to time t, the dividend
payments and capital gains have to equal to common return on either asset.
pijt(a) + V˙jt(a) = rtVjt(a) (3.23)
In an environment with taxes on capital income, the above equation implies that capital
gains from value of intellectual property are taxed, this gives the following equation;
(1− τv)rt = (1− τv)piit
Vjt
+
V˙jt(a)
Vjt(a)
(3.24)
Solving for Vjt(a) gives
Vjt(a) =
(1− τv)pijt(ajt)
(1− τv)rt − V˙jt(a)Vjt(a)
, where j = D,EX , EM (3.25)
Equating the value of the firm to the costs we obtain;
Vjt(a) = wbI(t)Fj such that j = D,EX , EM (3.26)
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Substituting the profit function given by (3.14) gives the entry condition into the do-
mestic market, as follows
(1− τv)Aσ(1− Φ)LYtΦ2σ−1a1−σD
(1− τv)r −
(
˙bI(t)
bI(t)
+ w˙w
) = wbI(t)FD (3.27)
For firms accessing the foreign market via trade the value function is as follows:
(1− τv)Aσ(1− Φ)%LYtΦ2σ−1a1−σEX
(1− τv)r −
(
˙bI(t)
bI(t)
+ w˙w
) = wbI(t)FEX (3.28)
where % ≡ τ1−σ, with (% = 0 describing the case of autarky and % = 1 describing free
trade)
The observation that not all firms export implies that the (aD > aEX ) and the costs
associated with foreign market entry are higher than domestic. Therefore we get the
following:
a∗Dt
a∗EX
=
(
FEX
FD%
) 1
σ−1
(3.29)
Finally for the firm entering via FDI we have:
(1− τv)Aσ(1− Φ)LYtΦ2σ−1a1−σEM
(1− τv)r −
(
ϑ˙
ϑ +
w˙
w
) = wϑIt(FEM − FEX )
1− % (3.30)
In a similar fashion dividing (3.30) by (3.28) gives the ratio of FDI cut-off costs to that
of exporting firms.
a∗EM
a∗EX
=
(
(FEM − FEX )%
FEX (1− %)
) 1
σ−1
(3.31)
Cut-off costs can be determined by using the zero profits conditions obtained from
equations (3.27), (3.28), (3.30). The threshold values of aD, aEX , aEM can be determined
by finding the marginal firm that pays fixed costs to enter and make zero profits. The
marginal costs of domestic firms is higher than that of firms serving foreign markets
through exports and FDI and has the lowest fixed costs among all the operating firms,
this implies that aDt < aEXt < aEMt . This translates to the notion that all firms
with marginal costs less than domestic threshold (a < aDt) will serve the domestic
market. Moreover, the most productive firms have an opportunity to sell to foreign
markets via FDI followed by exports. Tariff jumping motive of setting up a multinational
subsidiary in the foreign country implies that there no ice berg trade costs incurred by
the multinational firm, however the trade off is incurring larger fixed costs of setting
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up a subsidiary plant. A firm chooses to set up a foreign subsidiary rather than simply
exporting when the gains from avoiding trade costs outweigh the costs of maintaining
capacity in foreign markets.
Free Entry Condition
As in Melitz (2003), in addition to the cut-off conditions the free entry condition has to
hold in equilibrium. While the monopolistic competition features monopolistic pricing,
market entry is not restricted. The free entry condition implies that firms can develop a
new variety and by free entry condition the ex-ante expected profit of developing a new
variety must equal the cost of innovation. Without this free entry condition, infinitely
many firms would enter the market if the expected value of market entry was higher
than the costs, on the other hand if the expected value of market entry was lower than
the cost, there would be no incentive for any firm to develop new varieties. The expected
market entry is given by the sum of expected pay-offs from the domestic and the foreign
markets (via trade and FDI) net of fixed costs of entry into the markets, this must equal
the cost of developing a new variety.
∫ aD
0
[
VD(a)− wbIFD
]
dG(a) +
∫ aEX
aEM
[
VEX (a)− wbIFEX
]
dG(a)+ (3.32)∫ aEM
0
[
VEM (a)− wbIFEM
]
dG(a) = wbI(t)(t)FI(t) (3.33)
Equation (3.33) simply states that the expected value of net profits in the local and
foreign markets via trade and FDI must be equal to the cost of variety creation. This
condition can also be expressed ex post conditional on the probability of successful entry
as follows;∫ aD
0
[
VD(a)− wbIFD
]
gi(a)
Gi(aDt)
MDtda+
∫ aEX
aEM
[
VEX (a)− wbIFEX
]
gj(a)
Gj(aEX )−Gj(aEM )
MEXda+
(3.34)∫ aEM
0
[
VEM (a)− wbIFEM
]
gj(a)
Gj(aEX )
MEMda = wbI(t)FI(t) (3.35)
where gi(a)Gi(aDt) is the density function conditional on firms survival,
gj(a)
Gj(aEX )−Gj(aEM )
is
the density function conditional on the distribution of foreign exporters and
gj(a)
Gj(aEX )
is the density function conditional on the distribution of firms accessing the foreign
market via FDI. The conditional distributions of the intermediate firms are governed by
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the cut-off costs. The number of firms are given by the product of the density functions
conditional on distribution (conditional probabilities) of exporter firms and FDI firms
multiplied by the total number of firms available in the domestic country.
In the same vein as Melitz (2003), we proceed by calculating the probabilities of MNEs
and exporters conditional on the surviving firms in the domestic market respectively as
follows
βD = G(ai) probability of being in the domestic market in country i (3.36)
βEX =
G(aEX )−G(aEM )
G(ai)
probability of being an exporter conditional on surviving firms
(3.37)
βEM =
G(aEM )
G(ai)
probability of being a multinational firm conditional on surviving firms
(3.38)
Using these conditional probabilities of successful entry, the mass of firms that enter
foreign country via exports and FDI are given by
MEX = βEXMD mass of exporting firms (3.39)
MEM = βEMMD mass of firms entering via (3.40)
This implies that the total mass of varieties are given by
M = MD + βEXMD + βEMMD (3.41)
Substituting equation (3.27), (3.28), (3.30) into the free entry condition given by equa-
tion (3.35) we get the following
∫ aD
0
(1− τv)Aσ(1− Φ)LYtΦ2σ−1a1−σD
(1− τv)r −
(
b˙I
bI
+ w˙w
) − wbI(t)FD
 dG(a)+ (3.42)
∫ aEX
aEM
(1− τv)Aσ(1− Φ)%LYtΦ2σ−1a1−σEX
(1− τv)r −
(
b˙I
bI
+ w˙w
) − wbI(t)FEX
 dG(a)
+
∫ aEM
0
(1− τv)Aσ(1− Φ)LYtΦ2σ−1a1−σEM
(1− τv)r −
(
b˙I
bI
+ w˙w
) − wbI(t)(FEM − FEX )
1− %
 dG(a) = bI(t)F(I)
(3.43)
This simplifies to;
(1− τv)(1− Φ)LY
((1− τv)r − ( b˙IbI + w˙w ))
= MDF¯ (3.44)
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where
F¯ ≡ FI 1
G(aDt)
+ FD + FEX
(
G(aEX (t))−G(aEM (t))
G(aDt)
)
+ FEM
(
G(aEM (t))
G(aDt)
)
F¯ (t) = FI
(
a¯
aD(t)
)k
+ FD + FEX
(
aEX (t)
aD(t)
)k
+ FEM
(
aEM (t)
aD(t)
)k
(3.45)
∆t ≡
∫ aDt
o
a1−σ
ga(a)
Ga(aD)
da+ %
∫ aEX
aEM
a1−σ
ga(a)
Ga(aD)
da+
∫ aEM
0
a1−σ
ga(a)
Ga(aD)
da (3.46)
As in Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010), we define ∆t as the average marginal cost
weighted by the expost distribution of successful entry that considers the variable trade
costs. F¯t is the expected cost of innovation in units of knowledge
The flow of varieties is determined by the labour devoted to R&D divided by the labour
units required for successful innovation.
M˙(t) =
LI(t)
bI(t)F¯
(3.47)
Where Lit =
∑
lit is the sum of all the R&D carried out by firms in the economy. The
denominator contains the expected costs of new variety and time (t). Equation (3.47)
implies that the steady state rate of innovation is therefore given by;
g ≡
˙M(t)
M(t)
=
LI(t)
FbI(t)MD
=
LθI(t)(1 + λ)
φ
F¯M1−φt L(t)κ
(3.48)
Aggregation
Using the average productivity equation (3.46) and the domestic and foreign profit
maximizing prices into the the price index we can then find a closed form solution to
the aggregate price index. Following Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) in steady state
the CES price index in equation (3.17) can be written as;
P (t)1− = MD
∫ aD
0
pD(aD)
1− g(a)da
G(aD(t))
+MEX (t)
∫ aE
aEM
pEX (aE)
1− ga(a)
Ga(aD)
da+
MEM
∫ aF
0
pEM (aF )
1− ga(a)
Ga(aD)
da
=
(

− 1
)1−
M(t)∆(t)1−
= Φ1−M(t)∆(t)1−
(3.49)
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This equation shows that the price index is affected my the mass of varieties M , elasticity
of substitution and the average productivity. Higher levels of varieties drives down the
price index and the higher elasticity of substitution also pins down the price index.
Output is given by equation (3.9), taking into account the cut-off productivity, output
can be aggregated as:
Yit =AiLi
(∫ aD
0
XD(a)
Φ gi(a)
Gi(aiit)
MDda+
∫ aF
aE
XE(a)
Φ g(a)
G(aE)−G(aF )MEda+∫ aF
0
X(a)Φ
g(a)
G(aF )
MF
) (3.50)
Yit = A
1
1−Φ Φ
2Φ
1−ΦLYMit∆
1− (3.51)
where we recall that  = 11−Φ is the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate
goods and Mit = MD(t) + MEX (t) + MEM (t) is the total number of intermediates.
And Xit(i˜t) representing the intermediate goods produced by each firm i is produced
according the following costs
In the same spirit we recalculate the wages from equation(3.15) given by:
w = (1− Φ)AΦ2(−1)M∆1−LY (3.52)
This equation implies that the wage rate grows at the same rate with (M) the number
of varieties ( w˙w =
M˙D
MD
= g) and From average cut-off costs we can then re-write (3.50)
as follows:
Yit = A
1
1−Φ Φ
2Φ
1−ΦLYMit∆
1−
it (3.53)
In the same fashion we can rewrite the intermediate goods using the price index 3.5
X(∆) = A
1
1−Φ Φ
2
1−ΦLY ∆
−1
1−Φ (3.54)
This denotes the intermediate goods produced by an average intermediate goods firm
that serve a country i and the total cost for intermediate goods is represented by:
Iit = a˜itMitXi(∆it)
= a˜itA
1
1− Φ
2
1−σLYMit∆it
−1
1−
= Φ2Yit
(3.55)
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Final Goods sector equilibrium
Income can be used to generate intermediate goods or for consumption purposes;
Y = I + C (3.56)
where C is the total consumption and I is investment into production of intermediate
goods. We have already derived investment into intermediate goods given by equation
(3.55). This implies that consumption is therefore given by: C = (1− Φ2)Y
Labour Market Equilibrium
In this model labour is used in the innovation and in production of final output. The
labour market in this model is perfectly competitive. Aggregate labour in this economy
is the sum of labour allocated to the final good production and LY and labour allocated
to the R&D sector LI .
L = LY + LI (3.57)
From equation 54 this is given by:
LI = gFbI(t)MD (3.58)
Recall that
g ≡ M˙t
Mt
=
LI
FbI(t)MD
=
LI(t)(1 + λ)
φ
F¯M1−φt
(3.59)
This implies that
M˙t =
LI
FbI(t)
=
LI(t)(1 + λ)
φ
F¯M−φ
(3.60)
Hence the growth rate of innovations in steady state is given by:
b˙I
bI
= κ
L˙
L
− φM˙
M
− (θ − 1) L˙I
LI
(3.61)
Taking into account that in steady state the growth rate of innovations is equal to the
growth rate of the population we can re-write the above equation (3.61) of innovation
growth rate as follows (where L˙L = n =
L˙I
LI
);
b˙I
bI
= (κ− θ + 1)n− φg (3.62)
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3.3.5 Steady State Equilibrium
Steady State Cut-offs
In steady state the cut-offs for the domestic, export and multinational firm are respec-
tively given by:
(1− τv)Φa−1D LY
(1− τv)r + (θ − 1)g − (κ− θ + 1)n = M∆
σ−1bIFD
(1− τv)Φa−1X ρLY
(1− τv)r + (θ − 1)g − (κ− θ + 1)n = M∆
σ−1bIFX
(1− τv)Φa−1I LY
(1− τv)r + (θ − 1)g − (κ− θ + 1)n =
M∆σ−1bI(FEM − FEX )
(1− ρ)
(3.63)
Therefore substituting the steady state given by (3.63) into the free entry condition
(3.44), we obtain;
(1− τv)ΦLY
(1− τv)r + (θ − 1)g − (κ− θ + 1) = MDbIF (3.64)
We now proceed to use the above equation (3.64) to solve for the steady state value of
labour allocated to the final good production and we obtain;
LY =
1
Φ
FbIMD
(1− τv) [(1− τv)r + (φ− 1)g + (θ − κ− 1)n] (3.65)
And the total Labour in this economy is given by:
L = LY + LI =
FbIMD
(1− τv)Φ
{
r(1− τv) + (Φ(1− τv) + φ− 1)g + (θ − κ− l)n
}
(3.66)
The steady state share of labour allocated to the R&D sector is given by:
sA =
LI
L
=
1
1 + 1Φ(1−τv)
[
ρ+n(θ−κ−1)
g + (1/ζ + φ− 1)
] (3.67)
Where sA is the share of labour allocated to innovation activities in the model.
Proposition 3.1 (Labour allocated to innovation (LI) is decreasing in taxa-
tion).
From this equation (3.67) it is clear that higher capital taxes raised the interest rate but
reduces the share of labour used in innovation sector, more over the share of intermediate
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inputs in production declines. This implies that higher tax rates leads to a decline in
number of varieties along a BGP. This is shown by deriving the number of varieties
along the BGP MD;
M∗Dt =
[
Lθ−κsθA
g∗
(1 + λ)φ
F
] 1
1−φ
(3.68)
In this model the only source of productivity growth is the expansion of intermediate
inputs. Therefore it is worthwhile to note that trade and multinational production only
affects the intermediate variety by changing the fixed costs and knowledge spillovers and
the capital tax which in turn affects the labour allocated to production of intermediate
goods.
Proposition 3.2 (The growth rate).
Expansion of intermediate goods is the only source of productivity growth, therefore,
output growth rate and aggregate consumption are all equal to the rate of productivity
growth given by
g∗ =
1
1/ζ + Φ(1− τv) + φ− 1
(
Φ(1−τv)
[
gθ−1(1 + λ)φLθ−κ
FM1−φD
] 1
θ
−ρ−(θ−κ−1)n
)
(3.69)
According to (3.69) it is clear that there are two implications, firstly public policy changes
that affect trade liberalization has no effect on the growth rate, this result is also obtain
by Segerstrom (1998). This is due to the fact that the iceberg trade costs τ does not
appear in equation (3.69). Secondly the taxation rate affects the steady state growth
and the magnitude of the fixed costs incurred in accessing foreign markets either via
trade or FDI.
Proposition 3.3 (Impact of capital taxation on growth rate are non linear:
we deduce that in a high tax economy with high productivity firms, the
sensitivity of economic growth to an increase in taxes is magnified, whereas
it is dampened in the case of low tax economy with low productivity firms).
A close inspection of equation (3.69) shows that the impact of low capital e taxes on
long run growth rate is low or minimal, however increasing taxes leads to rise in the
marginal effect of taxation on growth. In our current model the non linearity arises from
the heterogeneous firm productivities. In a low capital tax economy, increase in taxes
results in exit of low productivity firms. The reasoning is as follows, low productivity is
a cost disadvantage, any cost disadvantage translates into large losses of market share.
These less productive firms can capture only a small market share. The impact of those
new entrants on aggregate growth rate is small. In the case of high productivity firms,
in a high tax economy, an increase in taxes leads to a large decline in growth rate.
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Comparing the above result to Segerstrom (1998) recall the definition of the growth rate
g ≡ M˙t
Mt
=
LI
FbI(t)MD
=
LI(t)(1 + λ)
φ
F¯M1−φt
(3.70)
log differentiating with respect to time and setting the growth rate equal to zero in
steady state along a balanced growth path we obtain:
g∗ = (θ − κ)n
1− φ (3.71)
That is, the growth rate is dependent on population growth rate and on the level of
technological spillovers. There are some restriction, i.e θ > κ and φ < 1. This growth
rate only shows that rate of innovation depends only on exogenous variables. It follows
that the steady state share of labour devoted to R&D is obtained by substituting the
growth rate along a balanced growth path (3.71) in equation (3.67) to obtain
s∗A =
1
1 + 1Φ(1−τv)
[
(ρ−n)(1−φ)
(θ−κ)n + 1/ζ
] (3.72)
It is clear that a higher capital taxation τv decreases the amount of labour devoted to
innovation activities as output (final good) production becomes more labour intensive.
Moreover higher the elasticity of substitution and higher share of intermediate good
inputs increases the share of labour in innovation. However the steady state s∗A in (3.72)
shows that neither export fixed costs or FDI fixed costs affect the share of labour devoted
to innovation.
Proposition 3.4 (Growth rate of output and consumption are equal to growth
rate of productivity gY = g = gc).
On the growth rate of output, first we turn to the price index and real consumption in
steady state. Log differentiating the price index in equation (3.49)with respect to time
and recalling that ∆ is time invariant gives the steady state growth rate of the price
index
gP =
1
1− g =
(θ − κ)n
(1− )(1− φ) < 0 (3.73)
Recalling that  > 1,this implies that along a balanced growth path the price index is
falling.
Recall that ;
Y =A
1
1−Φ Φ
2
1−ΦLM∆
−1
1−Φ
y = A
1
1−Φ Φ
2
1−Φ (1− sA)M∆
−1
1−Φ
(3.74)
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More over we derived that Ct = (1− Φ2)Yt → ct = (1− Φ2)yt. Bearing in mind that in
steady state all variables are constant except for the number of intermediates MD, the
growth rate of consumption is equal to the growth rate of output. In this model creation
of intermediates drives the productivity growth, if innovation activities stop, then both
output and consumption growth also stops.
Moreover we observe from (3.74) that the growth rate does not depend on tax rates.
This is s distinguishing feature of semi endogenous growth models. In contrast, first
generation growth models such as that Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992) all have
scale effects such that the growth rate of output may be influenced by tax instruments.
Proposition 3.5 (Effect of corporate taxation on output).
From (3.74), we deduce that there are competing effects of the corporate tax on the
out put; an increase in financial taxes lowers N but increases the fraction of workers
producing the final out put, i.e (1− sA) rises as the the corporate tax increases. If the
effect through the labour channel is strong enough (dominates the effect on N), then
higher corporate taxes may lead to higher output growth. This result of positive impact
of corporate taxes on out put growth was also a result in Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996).
In the same vein Chen et al (2016) argued that in the case of tax shifting from labour
income to capital income tax, raising capital income taxation increases the steady state
equilibrium growth rate.
Proposition 3.6 (Endogenously determined variables F , aD,aEM ,aEM are con-
stant for all t, they are solely dependent on exogenous parameters).
We already pointed out that the productivities are distributed Pareto, therefore it is
convenient to define that
β ≡ k
− 1 > 1 (3.75)
We therefore define the weighted average productivity as;
∆1− =
∫ aD
0
a1−
gi(a)
Gi(aD)
da+ ρ
∫ aEX
aEM
a1−
gj(a)
G(aEX )−G(aEM )
da+
∫ aEM
0
a1−
gj(a)
Gj(aEM )
da
=
β
β − 1a
1−
D (1 + ΩEX + ΩEM )
(3.76)
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where ΩEX = ρ
β
(
FEX
FD
)β
and ΩEM = (1 − ρ)β
(
FEM−FEX
FD
)1−β
The equilibrium values
for the cut-offs are given as;
aD∗ = a¯
[
FI(β − 1)
FD(1 + ΩEx + ΩEM )
] 1
k
aE∗X = a¯
[
FI(β − 1)(ΩEX + ΩEM )
FEX (1 + ΩEx + ΩEM )
] 1
k
aE∗M = a¯
[
FI(β − 1)(ΩEX + ΩEM )
(FEM − FEX )(1 + ΩEx + ΩEM )
] 1
k
(3.77)
The analysis of the cutoff productivities above shows that F¯ , a∗D, aEX , aEM are time
invariant , and solely dependent on exogenous parameters, this implies that the weighted
equilibrium is also time invariant and also a constant.
3.3.6 Steady State Effects of Openness (Trade Liberalisation and FDI)
In this section we proceed to examine the steady state impact (long run effects) trade
liberalization an and FDI which can occur either through a fall in variable trade costs or
fixed costs of foreign market entry. The degree of openness can be measured by changes
in (ΩEX ) and ΩEM . That is effects of oneness can be measured by changes in the iceberg
transportation costs τ and the fixed costs of reign market entry via trade or FDI FEX
and FEM .
Recall that ΩEX ≡ ρβ
(
FEX
FI
)1−β
where, ρ = τ1−, and ΩEM ≡ (1− ρ)β
(
FEM−FEX
FI
)1−β
In order to study the effects of openness on Growth separate them by first looking at
effects of Trade Liberalisation and thereafter effects of Attracting MNEs.
Effects on Trade Liberalisation
In the same spirit as Gustafsson-Segerstrom (2010), Figure 1 shows that trade liberal-
isation implies that ΩEX increases due to a decrease in ice berg trade costs τ ↓ or a
decrease in the fixed costs of entering foreign markets through trade FEX . when govern-
ments change corporate tax rates, by virtue of firms heterogeneity in the composition
of their capital stock, investments financing and involvement in foreign markets, they
induce heterogeneous effects across firms. The partial derivatives of ΩEM with respect
to ρ and FEX are given as;
∂ΩEX
∂ρ
= β
ΩEX
ρ
> 0
∂ΩEX
∂FEX
= (1− β)ΩEX
FEX
(3.78)
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Figure 3.1: Degree of Trade openness as a function of ρ and Fixed costs of export,
taking k=4 and  = 2
Figure 1 clearly depicts that if the infinitely increasing the iceberg trade costs (τ →
∞,⇔ ρ → 0), or increasing the relative fixed costs of export firms to domestic firms
labelled as Fx, this implies that the trade openness (ΩEx → 0) and the economy is
closed due to prohibitively high costs of doing trade.
Effects on Multinational Firms
We consider the fact that part of the MNEs fixed costs are policy related. Therefore the
MNEs fixed costs are treated as a policy variable for the number of firms that enter the
foreign markets via setting up subsidiary plants.
∂ΩEM
∂ρ
< 0
∂ΩEM
∂FEM − FEX
< 0 (3.79)
Figure 2 clearly depicts that if iceberg trade costs are infinitely decreasing (τ → 0,⇔
ρ→∞), or increasing the relative fixed costs of FDI fixed costs to domestic fixed costs
labelled as Fm, this implies that openness to multinational firms decreases as shown by
the negative derivative in the first part of equation (3.79).
In terms of the impact of trade costs on openness to trade and openness to multinational
firms we derived two opposite effects
∂ΩEX
∂ρ => 0 and
∂ΩEM
∂ρ < 0. Then we must address
which of the two is the dominationg force. To address this conundrum, we study the
find the sign of the first derivative of total openness i.e
∂(ΩEX + ΩEM )
∂ρ
> 0 (3.80)
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Figure 3.2: Degree of Openness to Multinational Firm as a function of ρ and Fixed
costs of export and Fixed costs of setting up a multinational firm, taking k=4 and  = 2
The above equation shows that the openness to trade is the dominating effect as the
derivative is positive
Effect on Cutoff Levels
We already proved that the cutoff unit labour requirements do not change over time,
i.e, they are constant. In a trade only model without multinational firms, Trade liber-
alisation (ΩEX ) increases the minimum productivity required to enter into the domestic
market ad ↑ and lowers the productivity to start exporting (aEX ↑). This result is anal-
ogous to Gustafsson-Segerstrom (2010); Chaney (2008) and Melitz (2003). This implies
that when trade barriers are decreased, exporting becomes cheaper and firms with lower
productivities can afford to enter the export market, this implies that the cutoff for
entering export market (aEx ↑) increases.
∂aD
∂ΩD
= −1
k
aEX
1 + ΩEX
< 0,
∂aEX
∂ΩEX
|FEX , const =
aEX
kΩEX (1− ΩEX )
(3.81)
Next we study how this result compare to our present set up with multinational firms.
This implies that we need to study the impact of openness on total weighted productivity
which is a composite of both export and multinational productivity. This leads to the
following proposition,
Proposition 3.7 (The effect of a Openness on the average weighted produc-
tivity.).
At the aggregate level, trade liberalisation leads to overall productivity increases. This
of course depends on fulfilling the endogenous sorting criteria, i.e.,
FEX
FEM
< τ1−. We
Chapter 3. Corporate Taxation, Heterogeneous Multinational and Trade Firms in a
Model of Endogenous productivity Growth 53
establish this proposition by taking the first derivative of the weighted productivity ∆.
Moreover we establish that a decrease in the fixed costs of entering foreign market via
FDI increased average weighted productivity.
∂∆
∂ρ
> 0 (
∂∆
∂τ
< 0),
∂∆
∂FEX
< 0,
∂∆
∂FEM
< 0 (3.82)
We can interpret the above equation as follows, trade liberalisation makes exporting
to be cheaper and induces firms that did not initially export but closer to the export
cut-off productivity to start exporting, this increases competition since the number of
imported varieties lowers domestic market shares in every market. Furthermore a decline
in the both the export fixed costs and FDI fixed cots increases the average weighted
productivity. Reducing the FDI costs paves a way for the most productive export firms
next to the FDI productivity threshold to engage in FDI which increases competition .
This induces tougher selection and increases productivity.
Proposition 3.8 (The effect of a Marginal Increase in τv in the growth rate
of the economy is negative.).
Arithmetic computation gives
dg
dτv
< 0 (3.83)
Although the sign of the first derivative is negative, it is key to state that a rise in the
tax corporate taxes depresses growth for lower values of elasticity of substitution (lower
level of intermediate goods) and but accelerate growth for higher values of elasticity
of substitution, this translates into inverse relationship between market power and tax
corporate taxes.
3.4 Conclusion
Differences that persist between multinational firms, such as their size, investments and
innovation levels are usually the mechanisms established in trade literature as some of
the determinants of multinational firms location decisions. In this paper we contribute to
literature on heterogeneous firm productivity and taxation by investigating the corporate
taxation effects on multinational and trade firms. We build a model that modifies Romer
(1990), Jones (1995) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) by incorporating what we
term corporate taxes (tax on financial income). We then carry out an analysis of the
economy whose growth is driven by innovation activities. We then explore how corporate
taxation affects such an economy in the presence of firms that operate in the domestic
market and foreign market either via international trade or via foreign direct investment.
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Firstly we find that corporate taxes have competing effects on the output level via
decrease of the number of intermediate varieties and an increase in final out put labour
supply. This implies that we get the result for certain higher taxes we still get higher
economic growth since the labour increase in final output implies increase in output in
the model. This implies a higher economic growth due to its equivalence to the output
growth. Secondly we find that openness to trade or multinational does not affect the
long run growth rate of the economy neither does it affect the share of labour allocated to
R&D sA. However trade liberalisation and openness to multinational firm production
had a level effect on mass of varieties produced M(t) ↓ due to slow down in variety
creation. Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) arrives to the same reasoning and explained
that as aEX increases more firms enter export market hence a rise in the number of
available varieties but this leads to more competition and lower profits, this in turn
induces fewer firms to enter the market thus slowing down the variety process creation.
On the other hand openness to trade and multinational firm production diverts resources
from product innovation as more units of knowledge are needed to cover the fixed costs
of market entry hence lower productivity growth. This is a very important result in
the dynamic set up as compared to the result in the static set up model of Helpmann
(2004) which pointed out that trade liberalisation and openness to multinational firm
production are always growth enhancing. To avoid monotony and repetition, we indicate
that a paper by Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) quantifies the overall effect even
though their setup is only restricted to trade.
Chapter 4
Impact of exhaustible resource on
opening for international trade:
Hartwick’s rule and taste for
foreign goods
The problem of exhaustible resources traded by resource abundant countries and the
effects on economic growth is of long standing importance in economics. van der Ploeg
(2012) points out that natural resource rents worldwide now exceed $4 trillion per an-
num, amounting to some 7 percent of global GDP, and Ruta and Venables (2012) claims
that (non-renewable) resources account for 20% of world trade. Hence understanding
the growth effects of natural resource revenue in an open economy cannot be overem-
phasised.
Static trade theory models following Ricardo, like one of Heckscher and Ohlin (1991)
emphasis that a country will trade (export) a commodity which uses its abundant factor
intensively or differences in factor endowments will prompt countries to export com-
modities for which they have comparative advantage. This shows that endowments of
natural resources may form the basis for trade in resource abundant countries. The
main shortcoming of trade theories is that they not directly address this problem of ex-
haustibility and the inter-temporal trade-offs involved. Due to resource exhaustibility,
prices change over time so are the levels of resources extracted, this necessitates adopting
a dynamic approach that takes into account the change over time in the availability of a
finite resource. Recently some dynamic arguments have been established for example by
Bajona and Kehoe (2010), but still effects of exploitation of natural resources in the open
economy are missing. In support of this view, World Trade Organisation report (2010)
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stated that the traditional model of trade like of Heckscher and Ohlin (1991), does not
directly address the inter-temporal trade-offs involved in resource exhaustibility.
Therefore understanding the impact of trade on exhaustible resources requires adopting
a dynamic approach that takes into account how finite resource stock varies over time.
Exhaustibility of finite resources requires analysis of how the resource stock dynamic
impacts production and prices and therefore the application of dynamic games frame-
work seems quiet natural here. In light of this view and motivation, the objective of this
paper is to analyse the impact of exhaustible resources on opening up for international
trade. We construct a dynamical theoretical framework of international trade with two
countries and three sectors (final good producers, intermediate good and resource sec-
tor). In our study, exhaustible resource is used in production of final output like in
model of Sethi (1979) with resource monopoly optimizing over the price of the resource
and not its extraction rate, like in seminal paper of Hotelling (1931). We determine
price evolution of the finite resource and final output when a small country opens to
trade. Moreover, we explore the extent to which exhaustible resource constraints can be
overcome by substitution and technological change.
The findings of our investigation are that when a resource abundant country opens up
to trade, demand for intermediate goods rises boosting technical change. This result is
obtained from direct comparison of evolution of intermediate goods demand under both
regimes (autarky and trade). Secondly trade opening leads to an increase in rate of
capital accumulation derived from non renewable resource revenue in the open economy
regime. Moreover opening of the domestic market leads to the switch in the mix of factors
being used for production, as the resource price increases overtime due to exhaustibility,
final good producers substitute it with intermediates in the long run boosting technical
change and total factor productivity due to new varieties of intermediates goods being
produced.
Our novel result is breakage of Hartwick Rule in a dynamic frame work of exhaustible
resource trade. In principle Hartwick rule shows that when resource rents are reinvested
in physical capital, consumption levels could be sustained. However in this paper we
find out that in the case of a trading resource abundant country, not all resource rents
are re-invested into the capital accumulation. This stems from consumer’s bias for
foreign products, that is, the more home consumers like foreign products, the more
likely expenditures will increase higher, than resource revenues. Therefore opening up
to trade may benefit home country only if it is not too much backwards and there is
some support of home produced products.
This paper contributes to several strands of related literatures studying optimality of
resource extraction and effects on economic growth. The first strand is the Ramsey
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type growth models, like those of Stiglitz (1974), Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Garg
and Sweeney (1978). The second strand is the endogenous growth models like of Schou
(1996), Aghion and Howitt (1998), Scholz and Ziemes (1999), Barbier (1999), Grimaud
and Rouge (2003). Unlike in our analysis, both strands of literature do not consider
impact of trade on resource price changes and extraction paths, final output price evolu-
tion or capital accumulation via trade. According to Todo (2003) developing countries
usually rely on foreign direct investment(FDI) as a major source of technological de-
velopment. We suggest that another channel which received less attention in models
of economic growth is international trade, through which there is improved technical
change (through the switch of the mix of intermediate good inputs and exhaustible
resources) and increased resource rents. The third strand is the literature on what is
termed the ”resource curse” as established by Sachs and Warner (1995) , which depicts
a negative relationship between countries natural-resource abundance and dependence
and their economic growth. In our paper we show that opening to trade may benefit
the resource abundant country only if it is not too much backwards and there is some
support of home produced goods.
While most studies of endogenous growth with exhaustible resources focus on an isolated
economy without trade and or FDI, a few studies related to our present work involving
natural resources and trade have been carried out. A model most closely related to
our work is presented by Gaitan and Roe (2012). Though they consider an infinite
time horizon of trade with exhaustible resources, the key focus of their study is distinct
from the objective of our paper. Their main aim was to show plausible conditions
under which the interdependence of countries through trade can give rise to the resource
curse. In their study they do not explicitly account for resource price determination in
autarky and in trade as we have demonstrated in this paper by applying the open loop
strategies. Moreover they abstract from intermediate goods driving technical change,
but they compare capital accumulation under closed and open economy. Finally we
account for breakage of Hartwick’s rule in when a resource abundant country is opened
to trade, which is not the aim of their exposition. A more recent study is by Yenokyan
et al. (2014) who investigated economic growth with trade in factors of production. They
concluded that trade in goods can raise growth rates of trading partners without any
technology transfer or international transfer. Our study departs from their approach
by considering technical change induced by intermediate goods used in final output
production.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows, section [4.1] presents the model, section
[4.2] contains the solution (with technical steps in Appendices), in section [4.3] we obtain
main results and propositions of the paper, in section [4.4] we provide the conclusion
and discuss possible extensions of the idea of this paper.
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4.1 Model
Consider the world economy with two countries, home, h and foreign, f . Home country
possesses an endowment of exhaustible resource which is used in production both in
home and foreign countries. The economies of both countries are otherwise symmetri-
cal: there are representative households consuming final product being made in both
countries, final goods producers, intermediate goods sectors and resource sector. Inter-
mediate goods are produced in the Romer-fashion but we assume constant variety of
available intermediaries technologies in the basic set-up. We describe each sector of the
home economy in turn since it is our main focus. Derivations for foreign economy are
symmetric and can be easily made.
4.1.1 Households
Consumption is represented by the representative household who supplies L units of
labour. As it is already standard (see for example Peretto and Connolly (2007)), we
assume that the population is constant and equal in both countries of mass Lh,f = 1.
We also assume that wage is equal across countries and is a numeraire such that w = 1.
The only source of income for the households is the resource rent plus interest payments
on savings. All of the income may be either consumed or saved: i.e a representative
household owns the resource stock with associated revenue stream pRR. Letting rh =
rf = r in the same spirit as Gaitan and Roe (2012) such that interest parity condition
holds, the flow budget constraint of the representative household at home is:
A˙h = rAh + pRR+ 1− pEh. (4.1)
Where Eh is the expenditures in the home country, Ef is expenditures in the foreign
country, pR is the resource price, R is the amount of exhaustible resource, Ah and Af
are the household asset holdings in the home and foreign country respectively. In the
foreign country the budget constraint is the same but without resource rent:
A˙f = rAf + 1− pEf . (4.2)
The only capital in this economy are financial assets of households which are not de-
preciated. This assumption is not crucial and cannot influence any results of the paper
except for the initial conditions on capital (assets) accumulation.
The household maximizes lifetime utility over an infinite time horizon subject to the
inter-temporal budget constraint and the usual No-Ponzi-game condition. We assume
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a constant discount rate and CES preferences preferences over goods provided by the
home and foreign country. Thus the household maximizes
max
Ci
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU(Ci)dt, i ∈ {h, f}; (4.3)
where Ci is a consumption at country i resulting from the combination of home produced
final good and foreign traded good:
Ci =
[
ϕ
1
χ (Ci,i)
χ−1
χ + (1− ϕ) 1χ (C−i,i)
χ−1
χ
] χ
χ−1
(4.4)
and utility is logarithmic:
U(Ci) = lnCi (4.5)
Note that χ denotes the inter temporal elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign consumption goods, ϕ and (1 − ϕ) denote preferences over home and foreign
goods respectively, where ϕ is the home bias; ϕ ∈ [0, 1]. A consumer also derives utility
from consuming imported goods, the more the bias is, the less a representative household
prefers imported goods.
4.1.2 Final goods sector
In this sector there exist home and foreign producers. They use resource being extracted
in the home country and a range of intermediate inputs (country-specific) in production
technology:
Yi =
∫ Ni
0
QηijdjR
γ
i , i ∈ {h, f}, j ∈ [0;Ni], (4.6)
0 < η < 1, 0 < γ < 1.
Where The sum of η and γ are in principle total factor productivity. labour being used
inelastically with L = 1.
The instantaneous profit function for final producer in country i is given by:
pii = pYi −
∫ Ni
0
pQijQijdj − pRRi − 1, i ∈ {h, f}. (4.7)
where last term appears due to labour costs.
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We assume that the resource is traded by the home country to both home and foreign
firms and the price pR is the same for both final sector producers at home and abroad,
but varieties of intermediaries are in general different and non-tradable across countries.
The equilibrium price at time t is related to industry output by means of a linear inverse
demand function:
p∞(t) = (a− Yh(t)− Yf (t)) . (4.8)
We assume that the actual market price, p(t), at time t is not equal to its equilibrium
level p∞(t), but moves towards it following a first-order adjustment process, i.e
˙p(t) = s [a− p− Yh(t)− Yf (t)] , (4.9)
The speed of adjustment is captured by parameter s, with 0 < s ≤ ∞.
The problem of final producers thus involves instantaneous profit maximization with re-
spect to the demand for intermediate products (capital) and inter-temporal optimization
with respect to the resource demand.
4.1.3 Resource sector
In our simple model, the resource sector is a monopoly, owned by the households. The
behaviour is thus described by a standard resource-extraction model. The profits are
given to consumers, who own this sector. In the same spirit as Dasgupta and Heal
(1974), and Hartwick (1990) the firm extracts resources without any costs and offers
them to the firms of the final-goods sector for a price pR per unit, not differentiating
across countries. Letting S(t) denote the resource stock at time t and assuming no
storage we have resource constraint
S0 ≥
∫ ∞
0
R(t)dt. (4.10)
The deterministic evolution of S(t) is described by total extraction equal to the demand
from both countries:
S(0) = S0; S˙ = −R = −RDh −RDf (4.11)
where, RDh and R
D
f are the exhaustible resource demand for the home and foreign country
respectively. Since storage is not possible, the quantity supplied to the market at any
time is equal to the total quantity extracted. The extracted resource is completely
homogeneous across all firms, hence there is no product differentiation in the resource
sector. Since we assume costless extraction, discounted profit to be maximized is given
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by
max
pR
∫ ∞
o
pRRe
− ∫ t0 r(τ)d(τ)dt (4.12)
where r denotes the interest rate.
4.1.4 Intermediate producers
The intermediate goods sector consists of a variety Ni of products. We assume the
range of existing intermediates to be constant, N˙h,f = 0 in both countries to simplify
the analysis. Every variety is owned by a single firm, which is interpreted as R&D
firm in standard dynamic case. All such monopolists have homogeneous technology of
producing variety at hand. The production function for monopolist j in country i is
given by
Qij = Kij ,
∫ Ni
0
Qijdj = Vi; j ∈ [0;Ni] (4.13)
thus the total assets stock is used for production of intermediaries (capital).
In each country, each firm j in the intermediate good sector maximizes the present
discounted value of profits flow:
Vij = max
pQij
∫ ∞
t
e−r(s)[pQijQij − riKij ]ds (4.14)
and establishes the equilibrium price for each individual intermediate product given the
demand from the final producers sector.
4.2 Solution
4.2.1 Households
The maximization problem of the household, (4.3) subject to (4.1) or (4.2) yields demand
for homogeneous final product. Households solve the problem in two steps,
1. They decide how to allocate expenditures between imports and domes-
tically produced goods.
Let Ei be the aggregate consumption expenditure in country i = h, f . The instan-
taneous expenditure constraint is given be
Eh = phChh + pfCfh (4.15)
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Ef = pfCff + phChf (4.16)
No trade friction implies that the law of one price holds across countries,
ph = pf = p (4.17)
thus prices of final goods sold at home and foreign countries are equal.
2. Agents choose the time profile of expenditures by maximising present
value utility.
max
C
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt ln
[
Ei
ϕχp1−χ + (1− ϕ)χp1−χ
]
dt; (4.18)
subject to (4.1) for the home country and to (4.2) for the foreign country.
Optimality conditions give the standard Euler equation in which at each moment
in time the rate of growth of expenditures on consumption is equal to the difference
between the instantaneous interest rate and the rate of time preference.
E˙i
Ei
= ri − ρ, i ∈ {h, f}. (4.19)
Assuming equal interest rates across countries, rh = rf yields equal growth rates
of expenditures.
4.2.2 Final producers
Final producers are facing the consumers demand, Ch, Cf and optimize over demand for
resource, RDi and demand for intermediate products, Q
D
ij . The total resource demand is
dynamic and has to be chosen by both firms, but demand for intermediaries is obtained
via maximization of the instantaneous profit functions.
We solve this problem in two steps.
1. Demand for intermediate products.
Perfect competition and profit maximization implies that marginal products are
equalised to factor prices. The demand for the jth variety of intermediate input
in country i can be written in the well known Dixit-Stiglitz form:
QDij : ηQ
η−1
ij R
γ
i − pQij = 0; (4.20)
QDij =
(
η
pQij
Rγi
) 1
1−η
= ηYi
pij∫ Ni
0 p
1−
ik,k 6=jdk
(4.21)
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Note that  = 11−η is the elasticity of substitution between varieties . The demand
(4.21) is the downward sloping for each intermediate input j and is known to the
monopolistic intermediate producer.
2. Demand for the exhaustible resource.
The only dynamic choice variable for both foreign and home final producers is the
resource demand. The dynamic problem for both firms is thus:
max
RDi
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
pYi −
∫ N
0
pQijQijdi− pRRDi − 1
)
dt, (4.22)
s.t.
p˙ = s [a− p− Yh − Yf ] (4.23)
where Qij is given by (4.21) and output is given by (4.6) for the home firm and
the same for the foreign firm.
In non cooperative games there are basically two strategies that can be applied; open
loop strategies and feedback strategies. Open loop equilibrium means that strategies
implemented by the players must be functions of time alone where as feedback (closed
loop) strategies are functions of time and the state. Closed-loop solutions to differential
games are mainly considered in the special case with linear dynamics and quadratic
costs. In this paper we employ the open-loop equilibrium concept we derive resource
demand through application of the Maximum Principle for both countries. The system
of equations is highly non-linear, therefore open loop strategies as opposed to closed loop
will enable us to obtain analytically tractable solution. Closed loop strategies will be
analytically challenging and require numerically approaches such as collocation methods
of value function estimations. Details can be found in the Appendix C.2. The optimal
demand for the resource is
RDi =
γ
1− η
1− γ
1−η
(
(p− λi)− η
pR
)1− γ
1−η
N
1− γ
1−η
i
((
η
pQ
) η
1−η
)1− γ
1−η
(4.24)
a function of final product’s price p and the shadow costs of production λi. Provided
the resource demand is a differentiable function, we can reformulate the problem to get
rid of shadow costs in the system. For that we use F.O.C. (C.16) to express λi through
resource demand and price and then make use of (C.21) to get the differential equation
on resource demand as a function of resource price, giving (C.24) in Appendix C.2.
R˙i =
(
˙pR
pR
− (1 + r)
) ∂Yi
∂Ri
∂2Yi
∂2Ri
− 1
pR
(a− Y−i − (2 + r)p)
(
∂Yi
∂Ri
)2
∂2Yi
∂2Ri
. (4.25)
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From equation (4.24) is trivial to deduce that an increase in the resource price pR leads
to a decline in the resource demand. Increasing varieties of intermediate inputs N
would imply that a monopolist charges a lower price pQ which gives rise to an increase
in resource price. The net effect is a decrease in non-renewable resource demand. As
the substitution parameter η increases (more intermediates inputs substituting resource
inputs) pR rises hence less resources are demanded by final good producers confirming
the above assertion.
4.2.3 Resource extraction
In this section we solve for the price and the quantity demanded of the intermediate
good. Profit maximization problem in the resource sector becomes :
max
pR
∫ ∞
o
pR(t)R(t)e
− ∫ t0 r(τ)dτdt, (4.26)
s.t.∫ ∞
o
R(t) ≤ S(0) (4.27)
S˙ = −R (4.28)
with R = RDh + R
D
f . The application of Maximum Principle (details in Appendix C.3)
yields constant price growth rate to ensure infinite time of total extraction: Thus the
growth of resource price is proportional to the interest rate:
p˙R
pR
= r
η + γ − 1
γ
. (4.29)
This is consistent with Hotelling (1931) rule that the optimal extraction path of an
exhaustible resource is one along which the exhaustible resource price increases at the
rate of interest times the ratio of total productivity and intermediaries (which are sub-
stitutes to the resource). This is a no-arbitrage condition equalizing the returns between
the exhaustible resource and other assets.
4.2.4 Intermediate goods producers
The producer maximizes profit function:
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max
pQij
piQij (Qij) = pQQij − rKij (4.30)
s.t.
Qij = Kij ; j ∈ [0 : Ni]. (4.31)
Since every intermediate producer is a monopolist in his/her own product, the firm
optimizes over the price with the demand given by (4.21). From this the price for every
intermediary may be defined and turns to be equal across intermediaries (since there is
no technical change and homogeneous technologies for all of them).
r = η2
(
Rγi
Q1−η
)
(4.32)
Substituting for QD we get the optimal pricing rule of a constant mark up over the
marginal cost
pQij = pQi =
r
η
(4.33)
Due to product symmetry, prices in all sectors are identical, The only parameters affect-
ing prices are r and η. We assume interest parity such that ri = r−i, which implies the
equal growth rates given by the Euler equation (4.19). Low values of η allow monopolist
to charge a higher mark up and earn higher revenues and profits. η captures intermediate
input share in output, low values of η presume less demand for intermediate inputs.
We can substitute for pQ and rewrite Q
D as:
QDij =
(
η
pQ
Rγi
) 1
1−η
=
(
η2
r
Rγi
) 1
1−η
= η2r−Rγi , (4.34)
where  = 11−η . Now substituting for the pricing rule in the profit function we get
pii =
∫ Ni
0
pQijQijdj − rKi = η2−1r1−Rγi − η2−r1−Rγi
= (1− η)
∫ Ni
0
pQijQijdj =
1− η
η
r
∫ Ni
0
Qijdj
(4.35)
That is, monopolist profits at every instance is (1−η) share of revenue. Thus with η > 1
the R&D sector is making losses and economy collapses.
4.2.5 Equilibrium, market clearing
consists of:
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1. Final goods market clearing Ch + Cf = Yh + Yf ;
2. Capital market clearing for every country Ki =
∫ Ni
0 Qijdj;
3. Intermediaries market clearing for every country Qij = Q
D
ij ;
4. Resource market clearing, R = RDh +R
D
f .
Now observe that the resource price growth rate is constant, (4.29). Thus the resource
demand dynamics (4.25) are transformed into
∀i ∈ {h; f} : R˙i =
(
r
γ + η − 1
γ
− (1 + r)
)
Ri−
1
pR
(
a−N−i
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
R
γ
1−η
−i − (2 + r)p
)
γ
γ + η − 1Ni
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
R
γ
1−η
i (4.36)
and substituting for output and resource price solution (which is a straightforward mono-
tonic solution for the ODE (4.29)) one gets the triple of equations, which describes the
evolution of the world economy:
R˙h =
(
r
γ + η − 1
γ
− (1 + r)
)
Rh−
1
p0
e
−r η+γ−1
γ
t
(
a−Nf
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
R
γ
1−η
f − (2 + r)p
)
γ
γ + η − 1Nh
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
R
γ
1−η
h ; (4.37)
R˙f =
(
r
γ + η − 1
γ
− (1 + r)
)
Rf−
1
p0
e
−r η+γ−1
γ
t
(
a−Nh
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
R
γ
1−η
h − (2 + r)p
)
γ
γ + η − 1Nf
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
R
γ
1−η
f ; (4.38)
p˙ =
(
a− p−R
γ
1−η
h
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
Nh −R
γ
1−η
f
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
Nf
)
. (4.39)
where p0 denotes the initial price for the resource.
The evolution of the world economy with two countries and open trade for exhaustible
resource and final product is thus given by the triple (4.37), (4.38), (4.39).
It is clear that under autarky the resource demand from the foreign country is zero and
the system is reduced to:
R˙Ah =
(
r
γ + η − 1
γ
− (1 + r)
)
Rh − 1
p0
e
−r η+γ−1
γ
t
(a− (2 + r)p) γ
γ + η − 1Nh
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
R
γ
1−η
h ;
(4.40)
p˙A =
(
a− p−R
γ
1−η
h
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
Nh
)
. (4.41)
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where superscript A denotes autarky regime. If the trade for resource is absent as well
as for final product the dynamics of the home economy is characterized by the couple
(4.40), (4.41).
4.3 Results
We analyse here the comparative dynamical behaviour of the system under open trade
of the resource and under autarky, when the resource is traded only within country as
well as the final product. It is relatively straightforward to see from the price dynamics,
(4.39), (4.41) that opening the national markets may either decrease or increase prices
of the final product and subsequently change the total demand for the resource. This
in turn characterises the usage of intermediaries (capital and technology).
We start by defining the steady states of both systems.
Proposition 4.1 (Steady states existence).
Steady states for both systems (4.39), (4.37), (4.38) and (4.41), (4.40) exist only if
γ + η > 1 (4.42)
otherwise resource demand has increasing growth rates until the full exhaustion of the
resource.
Indeed observe that only under this condition the exponent in resource demand equations
have negative power yielding contraction in time. Non-autonomous ODE systems may
have steady states only if their non-autonomous part is a contraction. Hence the result.
This means prices and resource demand may be stabilized in the system if economy
(both domestic and abroad) has high enough overall productivity. In this case the
accumulation of capital can substitute for resource in production and thus demand for
resource will stabilize at some level as well as prices. If instead, productivity is relatively
low, there is not enough additional savings to replace resources in production and rising
demand for goods (because of higher income of households) would lead to resource
demand increase and thus price increases up to the point when the resource is fully
exhausted. At this time no production will take place, since we assumed Cobb-Douglas
production technology.
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4.3.1 Autarky
The steady state for the autarky is defined by stable price for final product and stable
demand for the resource.
The implicitly defined steady state level of resource demand under autarky results from
substituting (4.44) into (4.43) and observing that the demand is stabilized only when
1. Economy is productive, e. g. γ + η > 1;
2. The fluctuations of demand stop, e. g. e
−r η+γ−1
γ
t → 1.
If the total factor productivity is lower than 1, γ + η < 1 demand cannot be stabilized.,
since the non-autonomous part does not vanish at infinity, e
−r η+γ−1
γ
t → ∞ and the
system explodes. If conditions above hold, there exist three different steady state levels
of resource demand: one of them trivially sets demand to zero, another one is close to
zero and the last one is non-trivially set at some positive level. These follow from the
algebraic properties of the polynomial (4.43), which has up to 3 real roots.
(
r
γ + η − 1
γ
− (1 + r)
)
RAh −
1
p0
(
a− (2 + r)pA) γ
γ + η − 1N
A
h
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
(RAh )
γ
1−η = 0,
(4.43)
p¯A = a− (RAh )
γ
1−η
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
NAh . (4.44)
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4.3.2 Opened trade
The steady state for the system under trade is defined similarly from the system (4.37),(4.38),(4.39)
under the condition of productive economy and thus vanishing exponent in resource de-
mand equations:(
r
γ + η − 1
γ
− (1 + r)
)
ROh−
1
p0
(
a−Nf
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
(ROf )
γ
1−η − (2 + r)pO
)
γ
γ + η − 1N
O
h
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
(ROh )
γ
1−η = 0
(4.45)(
r
γ + η − 1
γ
− (1 + r)
)
ROf −
1
p0
(
a−NOh
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
(ROh )
γ
1−η − (2 + r)pO
)
γ
γ + η − 1N
O
f
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
(ROf )
γ
1−η = 0
(4.46)
p¯O = a− (ROh )
γ
1−η
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
NOh − (ROf )
γ
1−η
(
η2
r
) η
1−η
NOf . (4.47)
with superscript O denoting the open trade regime.
As it can be seen, the same is true for the opened system. The difference comes from the
boost in resource demand and lower price for the final product experienced by home final
producers. At the same time under the open trade revenues of resource monopoly are
growing, increasing the households income. This income is then used for faster capital
accumulation and higher production of existing varieties.
For simplicity of further analysis we assume that varieties which are produced at home
and abroad are fixed and are not changed as a result of opening trade, that is NAh =
NOh = Nh, N
A
f = N
O
f = Nf thus only the level of production of each variety , Qij may
change. We start with the direct comparison of two steady states for the home economy.
Compare first steady state price levels in the opened and closed economy. The difference
is given by
p¯A − p¯O =
(
η2
r
) η
1−η (
(ROf )
γ
1−ηNf + (R
O
h )
γ
1−ηNh − (RAh )
γ
1−ηNh
)
(4.48)
which is the difference between home output under open trade and autarky plus foreign
output. This difference can be negative (thus final product price increases) only if the
home output fall more due to foreign competition then the total foreign output. This
could be true only if the home economy is relatively large comparing to the rest of
the world (foreign) and representative households preferences are biased towards foreign
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final product. In this case the resulting reduction of home output is so strong, that it
is not compensated by foreign output and final price increases instead of decreasing due
to increased competition.
Proposition 4.2 (Steady states prices comparison).
The steady state price decreases after opening up trade, p¯A − p¯O > 0 if:
1. The home final output at least does not decrease under trade,
(ROh )
γ
1−η − (RAh )
γ
1−η ≥ 0 (4.49)
2. The home output decreases to a lesser extent than the foreign output increases:
(ROh )
γ
1−η − (RAh )
γ
1−η < 0, Nh|(ROh )
γ
1−η − (RAh )
γ
1−η | < (ROf )
γ
1−ηNf (4.50)
otherwise the final product price increases, p¯A − p¯O < 0
This is a straightforward conclusion which does not need formal proof. Since our main
goal is to study how the opening trade would affect the developing country, we assume
Nf/Nh > 1 meaning the rest of the world is more developed. This increases the likelihood
of final price to decrease as a result of opening trade. From this observation we deduce
a corollary:
Corollary 4.3. The higher is the technological distance between home and foreign coun-
try, Nf/Nh the more final price reduction have to be expected from opening trade.
Now we analyse the changes in the resource rent, which governs the capital accumulation
at home.
Proposition 4.4 (Resource rent).
1. The price of the resource does not change from opening up the trade as long as
rf = rh and production technologies are the same, ηf = ηh, γh = γh:
pOR = p
A
R (4.51)
2. The resource rent under open trade (as long as resource is available) is higher than
under autarky by the factor of
pRR
O − pRRA = pR
(
ROf + (R
O
h −RAh )
)
> 0. (4.52)
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Proof is made by:
1. Checking the resource price movement equation which is independent of country-
specific parameters, (4.29);
2. Done by checking resource demand (C.26) with zero and non-zero foreign demand
and observing from proposition 1 that home demand changes is negative.
Thus the resource rent grows from opening trade as long as the final price drops (the
home country is technologically significantly backward) and technology is not super-
productive η < 1. Resource rent may also grow if the final price grows but technology
is very productive, since the relationship in Proposition 1 is reversed.
Observe that the quantity (Rh)
γ
1−η governs the home demand for each of the interme-
diaries expressed in terms of resource demand. As long as η < 1 intermediaries are
complements with the resource and increase in resource demand leads to the increase
in intermediaries usage too. However if η > 1 which means more productive technolo-
gies, the increase in resource demand will actually decrease intermediaries usage, making
them substitutes. This of course holds only as long as prices both for intermediaries and
the resource have fixed schedules, that is, rh = rf . Otherwise the home economy would
adapt its interest rate to the world one, making intermediaries cheaper.
From the (4.21) it follows, that under open trade the demand for intermediate products
as a substitute for resource is higher, since the resource demand is lower. This result
is in tandem with a widely held view in literature that introducing new intermediate
goods leads to an increase in total factor productivity(TFP) and causes growth. Thus
the opening of the domestic market leads to the switch in the mix of factors being used
for production, boosting technical change. This last is reflected in higher levels of Qhj ,
since the price ratio between the resource and intermediaries becomes more favourable
for the latter.
Proposition 4.5 (Structural change under open trade).
When the resource abundant country opens the trade, then:
For η < 1:
1. If rh > rf the demand for intermediate products increases, boosting technical
change. through cheaper capital;
2. If rh < rf the opposite effect occurs, making intermediaries relatively more expen-
sive and the economy more resource oriented;
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3. If rh = rf intermediaries usage may decrease at home, following the resource
demand.
It is interesting to note that it is not always good for technical change in the home
country to open up trade. The effect would depend on the relative price of capital at
home and abroad and on the productivity of technology. If capital at home is scarce
which is often the case for developing countries, structural change may be ignited by
the change in relative price of technology and resource based factors. However if the
technology is more productive, the effect would be reversed, since additional revenue will
increase resource expenditures and not the intermediaries demand. However this can be
the case only for η > 1, which means collapse of the home economy without technical
change. Thus we restrict ourselves only to the case of η < 1.
This may be demonstrated by direct comparison of evolution of intermediate demand
(4.21) under both regimes. The ordering would follow for the case of RAh > R
O
h in the
steady state.
Proposition 4.6 (Hartwick’s rule in the economy under open trade).
Due to Proposition 1 Hartwick’s rule does not always hold in the opened economy: not
all resource rents are re-invested into the capital accumulation.
Proof follows from the fact that consumption expenditures may increase after opening
trade, EOh ≥ EAh , both under decrease and increase of final price, depending on the taste
for foreign goods , 1 − ϕ parameter. Then it is possible to find such a configuration of
parameters space, ϕ, ρ, η, γ, r that simultaneously
EOh > E
A
h , pRR
O ≤ pRRA (4.53)
hold. This is sufficient for Hartwick’s rule to fail.
Observe that we do not discuss here how generic is the situation of Hartwick’s rule
breakage. This would require much more detailed simulations and parametric analysis.
However some raw estimations point to the key role of elasticity ϕ. The more home
consumers like foreign products, the more likely expenditures will increase higher, than
resource revenues. This is indeed the case for many developing countries: taste for
foreign products is high, and demand for resource is low since the rest of the world is
more technologically advanced. Thus we claim that according to our analysis, the open
trade may benefit home country only if it is not too much backwards and there is some
support of home produced products.
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4.4 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the consequences of opening up to trade in a resource
abundant economy, with particular attention on technical change, resource rents, capital
accumulation. The dynamic game, two country approach adopted in this paper allows
us to study trade effects and exhaustibility of non renewable resources in a unified
framework.
Our approach is different from endogenous growth models that study a closed economy
and do not take into account opening to trade. We summarise the main results of the
paper as follows; Firstly opening to trade leads to a switch in the mix of factors of
production. That is, opening to trade leads to more extraction of exhaustible resources
to supply both the home and foreign market, as resources get exhausted the resource
price rises and intermediate goods substitute for exhaustible resources in production and
thus demand for resource will stabilize at some level as well as prices. In the case of
relatively low productivity, there is not enough additional savings to replace resources in
production and rising demand for goods. This in-turn leads to resource demand increase
and thus price increases up to the point when the resource is fully exhausted.
Secondly, resource rents grow from opening trade as long as the final price drops (this
occurs when the home country is technologically significantly backward) and technology
is not super-productive η < 1. Resource rent may also grow if the final price grows but
technology is very productive. More over, As long as long as the parameter governing
technology (productivity) η < 1 intermediates are complements with the resource and
increase in resource demand leads to the increase in intermediaries usage too. However
if η > 1 which means more productive technologies, the increase in resource demand will
actually decrease intermediaries usage, making them substitutes. This gives the fourth
conclusion; under open trade the demand for intermediate products as a substitute for
resource is higher, since the resource demand is lower.
A final important result is in relation to Hartwick rule, in this study we were able to show
that not all resource rents are re-invested into the capital accumulation as claimed by
Hartwick rule. This stems from consumer’s bias for foreign products, that is, the more
home consumers like foreign products, the more likely expenditures will increase higher,
than resource revenues. Therefore opening up to trade may benefit home country only
if it is not too much backwards and there is some support of home produced products.
From the model and the results above, we infer policy implications and recommendations
for the developing exhaustible resource country. Firstly opening up to trade may boost
home direct investments through faster capital accumulation and will benefit consumers
without harming domestic industry. The higher is the current resource stock, the more
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beneficial such a policy may be. We argue that larger initial exhaustible resource stocks
leads to increased capital stock in the long run for the resource abundant country since
they receive trade proceeds of the exhaustible resources to the foreign countries. Larger
revenues may in turn be used as FDI replacement to stimulate consumption, this is in
the same spirit as Asheim (1986) who asserted that resource-rich economy can allow
itself to use revenues arising from resource exports to finance additional consumption.
Lastly investing in R&D in extraction technology might offset the depletion of today’s
resources, this is a possible extension to our model. Stuermer and Schwerhoff (2013)
found out in their study that resource stock may be increased through R&D investment
in extraction technology, they argue that even if non-renewable resource use and pro-
duction increase exponentially, resource prices might stay constant in the long term.
In the same spirit, WTO (2010) reported that allowing for technological change in the
extractive sector can effectively increase the supply of resources by contributing to new
discoveries and allowing extraction of stocks that could not be reached before.
The are several extensions that could be investigated using our framework. The model
allows for immediate extension of results on arbitrary n of resource-importing countries.
The extension of the number of exporting countries is non-trivial, since if one allows for
strategic interactions between them, the cartel collision behaviour may be observed.
It is also interesting to study the effects of price discrimination for the resource monopoly,
as it is frequently the case: home producers enjoy lower prices than foreign ones. In our
set-up such a discrimination may indeed boost home country revenues and thus capital
accumulation, but the decrease in foreign output would drive prices for the final product
higher and decrease the utility of households. Thus the price discrimination should be
treated with caution while might be implemented if the difference in home and foreign
technologies, represented by the level of available varieties is big enough.
Moreover, the process of technical change need not to be restricted to the growth in the
level of usage of existing intermediaries. One could also assume dynamic character of
Nh, Nf in the spirit of Peretto and Connolly (2007), Belyakov et al. (2011) or Bondarev
(2012). However this extension should require rather challenging analytical elaboration.
The limited capacity of the resource seems to play no role in the current model, because
the time of extraction is not optimized upon by the resource monopolist. However
this time of full exploitation should play an important role in the decision of how much
resource to export to foreign country and at which price. Moreover the market structure
of the resource should be paid more attention. The existence of oligopolistic structure
is common for resource abundant economies and is a matter of ongoing debates. This
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structure may be modelled by the means of usual dynamic oligopoly with the application
of the same Differential games apparatus.
Appendix A
Gains from Trade and FDI with
Heterogenous Firms
A.1 Aggregation Price Index
A.1.1 Trade Only Price Index
PEXj =
G(ϕ∗MF )−G(ϕ∗EX )
1−G(ϕ∗i )
Ni

∞∫
ϕ
EX
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1wijτij)
1−σdG(ϕij)

1
1−σ
(A.1)
Under assumption of Common Pareto distribution this becomes
PEXj = NEX

ϕ
EX
ij∫
ϕ
MF
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1wijτij)
1−σkϕkminϕ
k+1d(ϕij))
1−σ

1
1−σ
(A.2)
Evaluating the integral and substituting for cutoff productivities
P−kj = Nij
k
k − σ + 1
(
1
Yj
)1− k
σ−1
ϕkmin
(
σ
σ − 1wiτij
)−k (
σwjf
EX
ij )
)1− k
σ−1
(A.3)
.
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A.1.2 FDI only Price Index
PMFij =
1−G(ϕ∗MF )
1−G(ϕ∗i )
Ni

∞∫
ϕ
MF
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1)
1−σ[(Ωijτij)γ(σ−1) − 1](wijτij)1−σdG(ϕij)

1
1−σ
(A.4)
Under assumption of Common Pareto distribution this becomes
PMFij = NMF

∞∫
ϕ
MF
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1wijτij)
1−σ[(Ωijτij)γ(σ−1) − 1]kϕkminϕk+1d(ϕij))1−σ

1
1−σ
(A.5)
Evaluating the integral and substituting for cutoff productivities
P−kj = Nij
k
k − σ + 1
(
1
Yj
)1− k
σ−1
ϕkmin
(
σ
σ − 1wiτij
)−k (
σwj(
fMF − fEX
(Ωτij)γ(σ−1) − 1
)
)1− k
σ−1
(A.6)
.
A.1.3 Aggregate price index of all foreign varieties
For the Aggregate price index of all foreign varieties supplied via exports and FDI we
start with the following integral
P 1−σij =
G(ϕ∗MF )−G(ϕ∗EX )
1−G(ϕ∗i )
Ni

∞∫
ϕ
EX
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1wijτij)
1−σdG(ϕij)

+
1−G(ϕ∗MF )
1−G(ϕ∗i )
Ni

∞∫
ϕfdiij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1)
1−σ[(Ωijτij)γ(σ−1) − 1](wijτij)1−σdG(ϕij)

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P 1−σij = NEX

∞∫
ϕ
EX
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1wijτij)
1−σkϕkminϕ
k+1d(ϕij)
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+NMF

∞∫
ϕ
MF
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1)
1−σ[(Ωijτij)γ(σ−1) − 1](wijτij)1−σkϕkminϕk+1d(ϕij)

Evaluating the Integral and substituting for the cut off productivities
P−kj = Nij
k
k − σ + 1
(
1
Yj
)1− k
σ−1
(
σ
σ − 1(wiτij)
)−k
(σwj)
1− k
σ−1
(
f(EXij )
1− k
σ−1 + (
fMF − fEX
(Ωτij)γ(σ−1) − 1
)1−
k
σ−1
)
(A.7)
A.2 Aggregation of Sales
A.2.1 Export sales
XEXij =
G(ϕ∗MF )−G(ϕ∗EX )
1−G(ϕ∗i )
NEX

∞∫
ϕ
EX
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1wijτij)
1−σβ
Yj
P 1−σj
dG(ϕEXij )
 (A.8)
Under the assumption of a common Pareto distribution for all countries, this becomes:
XEXij = NEX

∞∫
ϕ
EX
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1wijτij)
1−σβ
Yj
P 1−σj
kϕkminϕ
k+1d(ϕEXij )
 (A.9)
Evaluating the integrals we get
XEXij =
(
k
k − σ + 1ϕ
σ−1
min
)
MEXij︸ ︷︷ ︸
supply capacity
(
ϕmin
ϕEX
)−k−σ+1 Yj
P 1−σj
(
σ
1− σwijτij)
1−σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
market capacity
(A.10)
Using the export productivity cut-off the last equation above can be re-written as:
Appendix A. Gains from Trade and FDI with Heterogenous Firms 79
XEXij = NEX
k
k − σ + 1
(
Yj
P 1−σj
) k
σ−1 ( σ
σ − 1wiτij)
)−k (
σwjf
EX
ij )
)1− k
σ−1
(A.11)
Equivalently this can be re-written as:
XEXij =
(
ϕmin
ϕEX
)k
NEX︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive
(
σk
k − σ + 1
)
fEXwj︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive
(A.12)
The effect of trade costs on export sales yields the extensive and intensive margins as
dlnXEXij
dlnτij
= − (σ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive
− (k − σ + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive
(A.13)
A.2.2 FDI or Multinational Sales
XMFij =
1−G(ϕ∗MF )
1−G(ϕ∗i )
NMF
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ϕ
MF
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1)
1−σ[(Ωijτij)γ(σ−1) − 1](wijτij)1−σβ Yj
P 1−σj
dG(ϕMFij )
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(A.14)
Under the assumption of a common Pareto distribution for all countries, this becomes:
XMFij = NMF

∞∫
ϕ
MF
ij
ϕσ−1(
σ
σ − 1)
1−σ[(Ωijτij)γ(σ−1) − 1](wijτij)1−σβ Yj
P 1−σj
kϕkminϕ
k+1d(ϕMFij )
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(A.15)
Evaluating the integrals we get
XMFij =
(
k
k − σ + 1ϕ
σ−1
min
)
NMF︸ ︷︷ ︸
supply capacity
(
ϕmin
ϕMF
)−k−σ+1 Yj
P 1−σj
[(Ωijτij)
γ(σ−1) − 1]( σ
1− σwijτij)
1−σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
market capacity
(A.16)
Using the FDI productivity cut-off the last equation above can be re-written as:
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XMFij = N
MF
ij
k
k − σ + 1
(
Yj
P 1−σj
)1− k
σ−1 ( σ
σ − 1wiτij)
)−k (
σwj(
fMF − fEX
(Ωτij)γ(σ−1) − 1
)
)1− k
σ−1
(A.17)
In the same spirit as the trade case(export) this can be re-written as;
XMFij =
(
ϕmin
ϕfdi
)k
NMFij︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive
(
σk
k − σ + 1
)
wj(fMF − fEX )︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive
(A.18)
Following Irarrazabal et al. (2013)The overall effect of an increase in variable trade
barriers on total affiliate sales can be decomposed into intensive and extensive margin
as ;
dlnXMFij
dlnτij
= − (1− γ)(σ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive
− (k − σ + 1)χMF︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive
(A.19)
Where χfdi is defines as the elasticity of FDI cutoff to variable trade barriers.
χMF =
(Ωijτij)
γ(σ−1)(γ − 1)− 1
(Ωijτij)γ(σ−1) − 1
(A.20)
A.2.3 Aggregate Sales(from all operations, i.e both exports and FDI)
X−kij = Nij
k
k − σ + 1
(
Yj
P 1−σj
)1− k
σ−1 ( σ
σ − 1wiτij)
)−k
(σwj)
1− k
σ−1
(
f
1− k
σ−1
EX
+ (
fMF − fEX
(Ωτij)γ(σ−1) − 1
)1−
k
σ−1
)
(A.21)
A.3 Expenditure shares
A.3.1 Trade Share(Income spent on Imports
λEXij =
XEXij∑
v
Xvj
=
(
ϕ∗ii
ϕ∗ij
)k
NiwifijEX
σk
k−σ+1∑
v
(
ϕ∗ii
ϕ∗vj
)k
NiwifvjEX
σk
k−σ+1
(A.22)
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Using the solution for the equilibrium mass of firms derived from the labour market
clearing condition and free entry condition we get
λEXij =
(Li/fiE)ϕ
k
mini
(
ϕ∗ij
)−k
wifijEX∑
v
(Lvj/fvE)ϕkminv
(
ϕ∗vj
)−k
wvfvjEX
(A.23)
Using the export cutoff productivity
λEXij =
(Li/fiE)ϕ
k
mini
w
−
(
kσ−(σ−1)
σ−1
)
i (τij)
−kf
1− k
σ−1
ijEX∑
v
(Lvj/fvE)ϕkminvw
−
(
kσ−(σ−1)
σ−1
)
v (τvj)−kf
1− k
σ−1
vjEX
(A.24)
A.3.2 FDI Expenditure Share
λMFij =
XMFij∑
v
Xvj
=
(
ϕ∗ii
ϕ∗ij
)k
Niwi(fijMF
− fijEX )
σk
k−σ+1∑
v
(
ϕ∗ii
ϕ∗vj
)k
Niwi(fvjMF
− fvjEX )
σk
k−σ+1
(A.25)
Using the solution for the equilibrium mass of firms derived from the labour market
clearing condition and free entry condition we get
λMFij =
(Li/fiE)ϕ
k
mini
(
ϕ∗ij
)−k
wi(fijMF
− fijEX )∑
v
(Lvj/fvE)ϕkminv
(
ϕ∗vj
)−k
wv(fvjMF
− fvjEX )
(A.26)
Using the export FDI productivity
λMFij =
(Li/fiE)ϕ
k
mini
w
−
(
kσ−(σ−1)
σ−1
)
i (τij)
−kf
1− k
σ−1
ijEX
(Ωvjτij)
η(σ−1) − 1)1− kσ−1∑
v
(Lvj/fvE)ϕkminvw
−
(
kσ−(σ−1)
σ−1
)
v (τvj)−kf
1− k
σ−1
vjex
(Ωvjτvj)η(σ−1) − 1)1−
k
σ−1
(A.27)
A.3.3 Aggregate Expenditure share
The aggregate expenditure share on all foreign varieties is given by adding the last two
expressions for trade and FDI expenditure shares
Appendix B
Capital Taxation, Heterogeneous
Multinational and Trade Firms in
a Dynamic Model of Endogenous
productivity Growth
B.1 Profits of the home, export and FDI firms
• Domestic firm maximisation problem
max
pD(ω)(ϕ)
pDt(ω)xDt(ω)− a(ω)xDt(ω) (B.1)
This yields price as a constant markup over the marginal costs
pD =
σ
σ − 1a(ω) (B.2)
and the revenue of this domestic firm are given by
RD(ω) = A
σLYtΦ
2σ−1a(ω1−σ) (B.3)
This implies that the domestic firm profits are given by
piD(ω) = A
σ(1−Π)LYtΦ2σ−1a(ω1−σ) (B.4)
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• Trade firm maximisation problem
max
pEx(ω)(ϕ)
pEx(ω)xExt(ω)− a(ω)xExt(ω) (B.5)
This yields price as a constant mark-up over the marginal costs including the
iceberg costs τ
pD =
σ
σ − 1a(ω)τ (B.6)
and the revenue of this exporting firm are given by
REx(ω) = A
σLYtΦ
2σ−1τ1−σa(ω1−σ) (B.7)
This implies that the exporting firm profits are given by
piEx(ω) = A
σ(1− Φ)LYtΦ2σ−1τ1−σa(ω1−σ) (B.8)
• FDI firm maximisation problem
max
pEm(ω)(ϕ)
pEm(ω)xEmt(ω)− a(ω)xEmt(ω) (B.9)
The multinational firm price is also a constant markup over costs, and in the same
fashion as for the domestic and trade firm we specify the price, revenue and profits
as follows.
pEm =
σ
σ − 1a(ω) (B.10)
and the revenue of this domestic firm are given by
REm(ω) = A
σLYtΦ
2σ−1a(ω1−σ) (B.11)
This implies that the domestic firm profits are given by
piEm(ω) = A
σ(1− Φ)LYtΦ2σ−1a(ω1−σ) (B.12)
Appendix C
Impact of exhaustible resource on
opening for international trade:
Hartwick’s rule and taste for
foreign goods
C.1 Derivation of the Euler Equation
First derive the Indirect Utility
Lets rewrite the utility U(C) as
U(Ci,i, C−i,i) = ln
(
ϕCρii + (1− ϕ)Cρ−i,i
) 1
ρ
, i ∈ {h, f} (C.1)
The consumers’ budget constrained choice problem has the Lagrangian
L = U(Cii, C−ii)− λ (Ei − pCii − pC−ii) (C.2)
The demand functions then satisfy the familiar tangency condition:
MRSii
MRS−ii
=
ϕCρ−1ii
(1− ϕ)Cρ−1−ii
=
pii
p−ii
= 1 (C.3)
Solving the equation for C−ii in terms of Cii we get:
C−ii = Cii
(
(1− ϕ)
ϕ
)χ
(C.4)
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Remember that χ = 11−ρ , then substituting C−ii into the expenditures we get
pCii + pC−ii = pCii + pCii
(
(1− ϕ)
ϕ
)χ
= Ei (C.5)
Cii =
Ei
p+ p
(
(1−ϕ)
ϕ
)χ = (p/ϕ)−χϕχp1−χ + (1− ϕ)χp1−χEi (C.6)
By symmetry the demand function for the foreign goods consumed at home is given by
C−ii =
(p/(1− ϕ))−χ
ϕχp1−χ + (1− ϕ)χp1−χEi (C.7)
The corresponding indirect utility function is therefore given by
U = Ei
ϕχp1−χ + (1− ϕ)χp1−χ (C.8)
max
C
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt ln
[
Ei
ϕχp1−χ + (1− ϕ)χp1−χ
]
dt; (C.9)
subject to (4.1) for the home country and to (4.2) for the foreign country. Optimal-
ity conditions give the standard Euler equation in which at each moment in time the
rate of growth of expenditures on consumption is equal to the difference between the
instantaneous interest rate and the rate of time preference.
E˙i
Ei
= ri − ρ, i ∈ {h, f}. (C.10)
Assuming equal interest rates across countries, rh = rf yields equal growth rates of
expenditures.
C.2 Derivations for final producers
The (current value) Hamiltonian functions for final producer in country i is:
Hi = pYi −
∫ Ni
0
pQijQijdj − pRRi − λi (s [a− p− Yi(t)− Y−i(t)]) , (C.11)
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substituting in it for Yi from (4.6) and normalizing s = 1 for simplicity
Hi = p
[
Rγi
∫ Ni
0
Qηijdj
]
−
∫ Ni
0
pQijQijdj − pRRi + λi
[
a− p−
(
Rγi
∫ Ni
0
Qηijdj
)
−
(
Rγ−i
∫ N−i
0
Qη−ijdj
)] (C.12)
and then for Qij from (4.21) one may write down explicitly Hamiltonian as a function
of resource for both firms :
Hi = p
[
Rγi
∫ Ni
0
([
η
pQ
Rγi
] 1
1−η
)η
dj
]
−
∫ Ni
0
pQij
([
η
pQ
Rγi
] 1
1−η
)
dj − pRRi+
λi
[
a− p−
[
Rγi
∫ Ni
0
([
η
pQ
Rγi
] 1
1−η
)η
dj
]
−
[
Rγ−i
∫ N−i
0
([
η
pQ
Rγ−i
] 1
1−η
)η
dj
]]
.
(C.13)
Assuming similar prices for all the intermediates, pQij = pQ we can integrate over and
obtain
Hi = pR
γ
1−η
i
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
Ni −R
γ
1−η
i
(
η
1
η
pQ
) η
1−η
Ni − pRRi + λi
[
a− p−R
γ
1−η
i
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
Ni−
(C.14)
R
γ
1−η
−i
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
N−i
]
. (C.15)
Taking F.O.C for resource demand:
∂Hi
∂Ri
=
γ
1− ηpR
γ
1−η−1
i Ni
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
− γ
1− ηR
γ
1−η−1
i
(
η
1
η
pQ
) η
1−η
Ni−pR+λi
[
− γ
1− ηR
γ
1−η−1
i Ni
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
]
(C.16)
Equating the derivative to zero we get resource demand as a function of prices:
pR =
γ
1− ηR
γ
1−η−1Ni
[
p
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
− λi
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
−
(
η
1
η
pQ
) η
1−η]
,
pR =
γ
1− ηR
γ
1−η−1Ni
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
[(p− λi)− η] (C.17)
RDi =
γ
1− η
1− γ
1−η
(
(p− λi)− η
pR
)1− γ
1−η
N
1− γ
1−η
i
((
η
pQ
) η
1−η
)1− γ
1−η
(C.18)
which is (4.24). Expressing λi from (4.24) through resource demands yields
λi = p− pR
γ
1−ηR
γ
1−η−1
i Ni
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
− η (C.19)
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giving
λ˙i = p˙−
˙pR
γ
1−ηR
γ
1−η−1
i Ni
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η − pR γ1−η
(
γ
1−η − 1
)
R
γ
1−η−2
i R˙iNi
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η(
γ
1−ηR
γ
1−η−1
i Ni
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
)2 (C.20)
Costate equations are given by:
λ˙i = rλi − ∂Hi
∂p
= (r + 1)λi −R
γ 1
1−η
i
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
Ni (C.21)
Given resource demand, (4.24), the evolution of shadow costs is defined by prices and
itself:
λ˙i = (r + 1)λi − γ
1− η
1− γ
1−η
(
(p− λi)− η
pR
)1− γ
1−η
N
1− γ
1−η
i
((
η
pQ
) η
1−η
)1− γ
1−η
Ni,
(C.22)
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and the same for λ−i. At the same time we may make use of (C.19) and (C.20) to
express dynamics of resource demand for each country from (C.21):
λ˙i = rλi − ∂Hi
∂p
= (r + 1)λi −R
γ 1
1−η
i
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
Ni =
(r + 1)
p− pR
γ
1−ηR
γ
1−η−1
i Ni
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
− η
−Rγ 11−ηi ( ηpQ
) η
1−η
Ni,
(
R
γ 1
1−η
i
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
Ni = Yi,
γ
1− ηR
γ
1−η−1
i Ni
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
=
∂Yi
∂Ri
)
, (C.23)
p˙−
˙pR
∂Yi
∂Ri
− pR ∂2Yi∂2Ri R˙i(
∂Yi
∂Ri
)2 = (r + 1)
(
p− pR
∂Yi
∂Ri
)
− Yi,
(
p˙− (r + 1)
(
p− pR
∂Yi
∂Ri
)
+ Yi
)(
∂Yi
∂Ri
)2
= ˙pR
∂Yi
∂Ri
− pR ∂
2Yi
∂2Ri
R˙i,
R˙i =
˙pR
∂Yi
∂Ri
−
(
p˙− (r + 1)
(
p− pR∂Yi
∂Ri
)
+ Yi
)(
∂Yi
∂Ri
)2
pR
∂2Yi
∂2Ri
,
R˙i =
˙pR
pR
∂Yi
∂Ri
∂2Yi
∂2Ri
− 1
pR
(
p˙− (r + 1)
(
p− pR
∂Yi
∂Ri
)
+ Yi
) ( ∂Yi
∂Ri
)2
∂2Yi
∂2Ri
,
R˙i =
˙pR
pR
∂Yi
∂Ri
∂2Yi
∂2Ri
− 1
pR
(
(a− p− Yi − Y−i)− (r + 1)
(
p− pR
∂Yi
∂Ri
)
+ Yi
) ( ∂Yi
∂Ri
)2
∂2Yi
∂2Ri
R˙i =
˙pR
pR
∂Yi
∂Ri
∂2Yi
∂2Ri
− 1
pR
(
(a− p− Yi − Y−i)− (r + 1)
(
p− pR
∂Yi
∂Ri
)
+ Yi
) ( ∂Yi
∂Ri
)2
∂2Yi
∂2Ri
=
˙pR
pR
∂Yi
∂Ri
∂2Yi
∂2Ri
− 1
pR
(
a− Y−i − (2 + r)p+ (1 + r) pR∂Yi
∂Ri
) ( ∂Yi
∂Ri
)2
∂2Yi
∂2Ri
=
(
˙pR
pR
− (1 + r)
) ∂Yi
∂Ri
∂2Yi
∂2Ri
− 1
pR
(a− Y−i − (2 + r)p)
(
∂Yi
∂Ri
)2
∂2Yi
∂2Ri
. (C.24)
Yielding the resource demand dynamics as a function of itself, final price and outputs
of both producers (which are in turn also functions of resource demand).
Evolution of the price itself is:
p˙ =
(
a− p−Rγi
∫ Ni
0
Qηijdj −Rγ−i
∫ N−i
0
Qη−ijdj
)
(C.25)
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C.3 Resource price determination
The total demand for resource is
R =
(
γ
1− η
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
)1− γ
1−η
((
(p− λh)− η
pR
)1− γ
1−η
N
1− γ
1−η
h +
(
(p− λf )− η
pR
)1− γ
1−η
N
1− γ
1−η
f
)
(C.26)
The optimization for resource monopolist is carried out with respect to price of the
resource, since demand is given and no market segmentation is assumed. Current value
Hamiltonian is:
HR = pRR− λRR (C.27)
with R given by (C.26). Differentiation w. r. t. pR yields price proportional to shadow
costs of extraction:
∂HR
∂pR
= R+ pR
∂R
∂pR
− λR ∂R
∂pR
= 0, (C.28)
with derivative of resource demand proportional to the demand itself
∂R
∂pR
=
− (1− γ
1− η )
1
pR
(
γ
1− η
(
η
pQ
) η
1−η
)1− γ
1−η
((
(p− λh)− η
pR
)1− γ
1−η
N
1− γ
1−η
h +(
(p− λf )− η
pR
)1− γ
1−η
N
1− γ
1−η
f
)
=
− (1− γ
1− η )
1
pR
R,
we define the price of the resource:
− (1− γ
1− η )R (1− λR/pR) +R = 0, (C.29)
λR
pR
R 6=0
=
γ
η + γ − 1 . (C.30)
The dynamics of the co-state is:
λ˙R = rλR − ∂H
R
∂S
= rλR. (C.31)
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transversality condition is given by
lim
t→∞ pR(t)R(t)e
− ∫ t0 r(τ)dτ = 0 (C.32)
Thus the growth of resource price is proportional to the interest rate:
˙pR =
η + γ − 1
γ
λ˙R = r
η + γ − 1
γ
λr → p˙R
pR
= r
η + γ − 1
γ
. (C.33)
giving (4.29).
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